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Abstract
This dissertation analyzes several questions related to international finance and
regulation. The first chapter analyzes the effect of macroprudential policy on eco-
nomic growth. The second chapter analyzes the effect of market insurance on sovereign
borrowing. The third chapter analyzes the role of self-regulation versus government
regulation.
The first chapter studies the impact of optimal macroprudential policy on financial
stability and economic growth. Many emerging market economies have used macro-
prudential policy to mitigate the risk of financial crises and the resulting output
losses. However, macroprudential policy may reduce economic growth in good times.
I introduce endogenous growth into a small open economy model with occasionally
binding collateral constraints in order to study the impact of macroprudential policy
on financial stability and growth. In a calibrated version of the model, I find that
optimal macroprudential policy reduces the probability of crisis by two thirds at the
cost of lowering average growth by a small amount (0.01 percentage point). More-
over, macroprudential policy can generate welfare gains equivalent to a 0.06 percent
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permanent increase in annual consumption.
The second chapter studies the welfare gains from market insurance. It is a joint
work with Fabian Valencia. Over the past two decades, Mexico has hedged oil price
risk through the purchase of put options. We examine the welfare gains from hedging
as a complement to issuing defaultable debt using a standard sovereign default model
calibrated to Mexican data. We show that hedging can increase welfare by reduc-
ing income volatility and default incentives, which ultimately reduces risk spreads
on sovereign debt. We find welfare gains equivalent to a permanent increase in con-
sumption of 0.44 percent. We then decompose these gains by examining whether they
come from a reduction in risk spreads or income smoothing. We conclude that about
90 percent of welfare gains stem from the former channel. Sensitivity analyses show
that the welfare gains decline when the cost of the options exceeds the actuarially fair
price, and increase with the hedged volume of oil, the strike price, the volatility of oil
prices, and with introducing risk aversion among foreign investors. Finally, selling oil
forward can generate larger welfare gains than buying put options.
The third chapter studies the trade-off between self-regulation and government
regulation. Who should be responsible for industry regulation, a private self-regulatory
agency or a public agency? This chapter provides a simple framework to analyze
the optimal scope of a private self-regulatory organization (SRO) versus government
regulation. The trade-off depends on three key elements: externalities, monopoly
distortions and the degree of asymmetric information. Self-regulation is more desir-
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able than government regulation if the degree of asymmetric information between
the public regulator and private industry is larger than the size of monopoly distor-
tion and externalities from the industry to society. An optimal mechanism consists
of both self-regulation and government regulation where an SRO internalizes exter-
nalities within the industry and the government corrects any distortions generated
by the SRO. These insights can be applied to many practical settings and policy
discussions—for example, in the context of the financial sector, as with the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
Advisors: Olivier Jeanne, Anton Korinek and Christopher Carroll
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Chapter 1
Financial Stability, Growth and
Macroprudential Policy
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-2009, the use of macroprudential
policy to manage boom-bust cycles came to the forefront of macroeconomic research.
By limiting excessive capital inflows, the goal of macroprudential policy is to mitigate
the risk of financial crises and the resulting output losses. However, policy interven-
tions designed to reduce financial instability may negatively affect long-run economic
growth.1 This raises the question of how much impact macroprudential policy has on
1Some previous literature suggests that countries with more financial crises have higher average
growth rates (see Rancière et al. (2008)). Therefore, macroprudential policy aiming to reduce the
frequency of crises may lower average growth.
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growth and whether such impact changes the benefits of macroprudential policy.
To answer these questions, this paper introduces endogenous growth into a small
open economy (SOE) model with occasionally binding collateral constraints that has
been widely used in the literature to make the case for macroprudential policy. Al-
though previous research looks at the welfare consequence of macroprudential policy,
financial crises in the existing framework only have a temporary effect on output,2
which is inconsistent with the data.3 By introducing endogenous growth, crises in my
model have persistent output-level effects, which allows me to analyze the impact of
optimal policy on financial stability and economic growth.
In my model, I endogenize growth by introducing an endogenous productivity
process, which can be affected by the occasionally binding collateral constraints. In
each period, private agents can use resources to invest in a technology that increases
productivity. In a crisis, when the collateral constraint binds, they are forced to cut
spending and thus investment in the technology. As a result, crisis periods lead to
lower growth.
Unsurprisingly, there is room in my model for policy intervention to address over-
borrowing. Like other papers (e.g., Jeanne and Korinek (2010b) and Bianchi and
Mendoza (2018)), I analyze the role of macroprudential policy by considering a social
planner with an instrument to manage capital flows.4 Unlike the existing literature,
2In the existing literature, productivity growth is by assumption exogenous. See Jeanne and
Korinek (2010b), Bianchi (2011), Benigno et al. (2013), and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018).
3There is strong evidence that financial crises have very persistent effects on output. See Cerra
and Saxena (2008), Reinhart and Reinhart (2009), Rogoff and Reinhart (2009), and Ball (2014).
4This policy is prudential capital control. See Korinek (2011), Jeanne (2012), Jeanne et al. (2012),
2
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however, I do so in an environment that allows me to evaluate the policy’s impact on
average growth. As an extension, I also analyze the role of a stimulus policy in addi-
tion to macroprudential policy by considering a social planner using two instruments
to influence the composition of spending. This allows me to evaluate the policy de-
bate on ex-ante and ex-post intervention (see Benigno et al. (2013, 2016) and Jeanne
and Korinek (2013)).
In general, the impact of macroprudential policy on average growth is ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, macroprudential policy increases growth during crises because
it reduces financial vulnerabilities. On the other hand, it also lowers growth dur-
ing normal periods because it reduces external borrowing and thus the expenditures
to increase productivity. The calibrated version of my model reveals that optimal
macroprudential policy reduces the probability of crises from 6.2 percent to 1.9 per-
cent (about two thirds), at the cost of lowering average growth by 0.01 percentage
point.
Furthermore, I find that the welfare gains from optimal macroprudential policy are
equivalent to a 0.06 percent permanent increase in annual consumption. Similar to
existing literature, macroprudential policy increases welfare by limiting the likelihood
of financial crises, therefore helping agents to smooth consumption. In fact, in the
model, that effect is stronger with endogenous growth. However, macroprudential
policy successfully restricts over-borrowing in the upswing, thus reducing average
and IMF (2012) for a detailed overview.
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growth. Overall, macroprudential policy still improves welfare. The gains are similar
to those in the related literature (see Jeanne and Korinek (2010b) and Bianchi (2011)).
In my model, the use of macroprudential policy limits borrowing and thus spending
for the technology for growth. A natural question, then, is to ask whether there are
other policy tools that can be implemented in tandem with macroprudential policy (a
capital flow tax) to offset the negative impact of the policy on growth. To answer this
question, I consider a social planner with two instruments. The first instrument is a
capital flow tax, while the second instrument is a growth subsidy that can be used
to change the composition of spending on the technology for growth. This exercise
also allows me to analyze the role of ex-post intervention because this social planner
uses two tools to intervene both ex-ante and ex-post, different from the social planner
with only the capital flow tax who only intervenes ex-ante.
I find that the social planner with two instruments can generate much larger wel-
fare benefits than the social planner with only one instrument. Quantitatively, the
gains are equivalent to a 0.24 percent permanent increase in annual consumption.
Two instruments enable the social planner to intervene ex-post and thus mitigate the
cost of crises. These two instruments used ex-post act as a stimulus policy. Ex-ante,
the social planner uses capital flow tax to correct over-borrowing in the credit mar-
ket. In this case, capital flow tax act as a macroprudential policy. However, the social
planner also uses the growth subsidy to offset the negative effect of macroprudential
policy on growth. The ex-ante growth subsidy thus belongs to the stimulus policy.
4
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The availability of the stimulus policy is beneficial because it leads to a short-run
boom in both growth and consumption, which is not seen in the economy with only
macroprudential policy.
Relation to Literature
This paper is related to the literature on the relationship between growth and
stability, in which empirical evidence often leads to mixed results. There are papers
on the cross-country relationship between average growth and volatility of growth.
For example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) find a negative relationship between average
growth and volatility of growth, while Rancière et al. (2008) argue that countries ex-
periencing more crises (more volatile growth) have higher average growth (see Levine
(2005) for a summary). Moreover, there are also papers on the impact of policy on
growth and financial stability. For example, Sánchez and Gori (2016) find that cer-
tain growth-promoting policies can have negative side-effects on financial stability,
while Boar et al. (2017) find that macroprudential policy can increase both financial
stability and long-run economic growth. This paper finds a negative relationship be-
tween average growth and financial stability for macroprudential policy, consistent
with Rancière et al. (2008) and Sánchez and Gori (2016). However, this relationship
depends on calibrations and might become positive in some cases, which is consistent
with the findings in Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Boar et al. (2017).
This paper is also related to the literature on short-run fluctuations and growth.
5
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There are two existing approaches in the literature to introduce endogenous growth
into a standard DSGE framework: One approach models growth following Romer
(1990), such as Comin and Gertler (2006), Queraltó (2015), and Guerron-Quintana
and Jinnai (2014). The other approach models growth following Aghion and Howitt
(1992), such as Ates and Saffie (2016) and Benigno and Fornaro (2017). My way of
modeling growth is similar to the first approach, which preserves the representative-
agent framework. However, unlike the existing literature, which focuses on a positive
analysis, my paper is interested in the characterization of optimal policy and the
policy’s impact on growth and welfare.
Finally, this paper belongs to the literature on optimal macroprudential policy
and capital flow management. The theoretical rationale for macroprudential policy
includes pecuniary externalities (see Lorenzoni (2008), Jeanne and Korinek (2010a),
and Dávila and Korinek (2017)) and aggregate demand externalities (see Farhi and
Werning (2016) and Korinek and Simsek (2016)). The general takeaway from the
theories is that ex-ante policy intervention can be welfare-improving, since it addresses
over-borrowing in the credit market and thus reduces financial instability. However,
the literature has been silent on the effect of ex-ante intervention on economic growth,
which is the main focus of this paper. Specifically, this paper introduces endogenous
growth into a standard SOE-DSGE model with occasional binding constraints (see
Jeanne and Korinek (2010b), Mendoza (2010), and Bianchi (2011)). Unlike in other
literature, crises have persistent output-level effects in this model, consistent with the
6
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empirical evidence. Furthermore, endogenous growth also enables me to evaluate the
debate on ex-ante versus ex-post interventions (see Benigno et al. (2013, 2016) and
Jeanne and Korinek (2013)). In particular, I focus not only on the benefits of ex-ante
and ex-post interventions but also on their impacts on economic growth.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 1.2 presents a benchmark
model; Section 1.3 presents a normative analysis for macroprudential policy; Section
1.4 presents the calibration procedure and model performance; Section 1.5 presents
quantitative analysis; Section 1.6 presents an extension to analyze the role of other
policy instruments; and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model Economy
This section introduces an analytical framework that incorporates endogenous
growth into an SOE model as in Jeanne and Korinek (2010b) and Bianchi and Men-
doza (2018). One feature of the model is an occasionally binding collateral constraint.
It has been used in the literature since Mendoza (2010) to model financial crises. In
the model, normal periods are when the constraint is slack, and crisis periods are
when the constraint binds.
7
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1.2.1 Analytical Framework
In my model, the economy is populated by a continuum of identical households
that have access to an international capital market and a technology that increases
productivity. Due to friction in the financial market, there exist collateral borrow-
ing constraints, and the maximum amount of external borrowing cannot exceed the
value of collateral. In normal periods, when the constraints are slack, households are
able to finance their desired levels of expenditure through external borrowing. The
economy thus grows at a normal rate. In crises, when the collateral constraints bind,
households cannot finance enough expenditures for the technology. As a result, the
growth rate drops.
Preferences: Households have the following Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)











where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, γ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ct is
consumption, andHt is the subsistence level of consumption. Given that the economy
is growing, I assume that Ht depends on the level of endogenous productivity zt and
8
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL STABILITY, GROWTH AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
takes the functional form:5
Ht = hzt (1.2)
Without Ht, private agents find it costly to cut zt+1, since that implies a per-
manent future loss in output.6 As a result, the growth rate barely falls when there
is a negative shock. The presence of Ht reduces the cost of cutting zt+1, since the
future subsistence level of consumption Ht+1 decreases with zt+1. Therefore, this
non-standard assumption with Ht allows my model to generate a large growth rate
decrease in financial crises.7
Production Function: Production only requires a productive asset nt as an input




where At represents the productivity level in the economy and α ∈ (0, 1). Productive
asset nt is an endowment to households and is normalized to 1. It corresponds to an
asset in fixed supply, such as land. In each period, households trade the productive
5h > 0 is a constant.
6As I will explain below, future output yt+1 depends on productivity zt+1.
7In a model with endogenous growth, it is very costly to reduce productivity, and thus growth,
following a shock. Instead, private agents cut consumption spending. To have a large decrease in
growth, one may want to raise the cost of cutting consumption, such as by increasing the risk-aversion
of utility functions. However, neither a high coefficient of risk aversion γ nor Epstein-Zin preference
leads to a large decrease in growth following a crisis. One might also want to introduce habit, as
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). But their formulation introduces an additional state variable,
which complicates the computation. My way of modeling Ht is simpler, and one can interpret it as
a habit that depends on the level of zt in the economy.
9
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asset nt at a market-determined price qt.
Endogenous Productivity: The level of productivity At takes the following form:
At = θtzt (1.4)
where θt is a stationary exogenous productivity shock, and zt is non-stationary en-
dogenous productivity chosen by private agents.
Source of Growth: Growth in the economy comes from the endogenous produc-
tivity zt that households can choose. Specifically, there is a technology that costs
Ψ(zt+1, zt) units of consumption to elevate endogenous productivity from zt to zt+1. I
call Ψ(zt+1, zt) “growth-enhancing expenditures,” which include all the expenditures
that facilitate long-term economic growth. Here I do not take a stand on any partic-
ular form of endogenous growth, but use a generic form that includes many models in
the growth literature. For example, Ψ(zt+1, zt) includes physical capital investment in
the AK growth framework as in Romer (1986), human capital investment as in Lucas
(1988), R&D expenditure as in Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), etc.
The only restriction is that there are no externalities in the process of choosing zt+1.
When private agents choose zt+1, they internalize its impact on not only the future
subsistence level of consumption Ht+1 but also the future cost function, Ψ(zt+2, zt+1).
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This restriction thus shuts down any externalities in endogenous growth.8 This de-
parts from the literature on short-run fluctuations and growth, where economic growth
is typically suboptimal (see Comin and Gertler (2006) and Kung and Schmid (2015)).
Financial Friction: I introduce a collateral constraint on external borrowing fol-
lowing Jeanne and Korinek (2010b) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018). Specifically,
households can purchase bt+1 units of a one-period bond from the international mar-
ket in each period, and these bonds promise a gross interest rate 1 + r in the next
period. The domestic economy is atomistic in the international world and takes the
interest rate as given. Furthermore, bonds are supplied with infinite elasticity. How-
ever, there is a source of financial friction in the market: Private agents need to post
their productive assets as collateral for external borrowing, and the maximum amount
of external borrowing cannot exceed a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of the collateral value qt.9
8As I will explain in the next section, there are pecuniary externalities in the economy that justify
an optimal policy. However, both externalities in growth and pecuniary externalities typically call
for policy intervention to increase national saving. If both of them present in the economy, it is
hard to disentangle their effects. Furthermore, externalities in endogenous growth tend to dominate
pecuniary externalities.
9One rationale for the collateral constraint is as follows: There is a moral hazard problem between
domestic households and international investors (see Jeanne and Korinek (2010b)). Households have
the option to invest in a scam that prevents international investors from seizing future productive
assets. This implies that households can default on their debts without any punishment. The
investors, however, cannot coordinate to punish the households by excluding them from the market.
What they can do is take households to court before the scam is completed. By doing so, they
can only seize a fraction φ of productive assets and sell them to other households at the prevailing
market price qt. As a result, rational international investors will restrict the amount of external
borrowing up to φqt.
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Therefore, the collateral constraint can be written as
− bt+1 ≤ φqt (1.5)
Budget Constraint: In each period, households make expenditure plans for con-
sumption ct and growth-enhancing expenditures Ψ(zt+1, zt) and purchase productive
assets qtnt+1 and bond holdings bt+1. Their incomes come from the output yt, sale of
productive assets qtnt, and existing bond holdings (1 + r)bt. As a result, the budget
constraint can be written as follows:
ct + Ψ(zt+1, zt) + qtnt+1 + bt+1 = yt + qtnt + (1 + r) bt, (1.6)
Market Clearing: There are two markets in the economy: the final goods market
and the productive asset market. Given that the productive asset is in fixed supply
and owned by the households, the equilibrium condition implies that
nt = 1, ∀t (1.7)
The final goods market can be pinned down by aggregating the budget constraint for
each household and applying the equilibrium condition (1.7) in the productive asset
12
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market.
ct + Ψ(zt+1, zt) + bt+1 = yt + (1 + r) bt, (1.8)
1.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium (CE)
Competitive Equilibrium: In this economy, equilibrium consists of a stochastic
process {ct, zt+1, nt+1, bt+1}∞t=0 chosen by the households and an asset price {qt}
∞
t=0,
given initial values {b0, z0} and the exogenous shock {θt}∞t=0 such that utility (1.1) is
maximized, constraints (1.5) and (1.6) are satisfied, and the productive assets and
goods market clear, i.e., conditions (1.7) and (1.8) are satisfied.
Recursive Formulation: It is convenient to define net consumption by cht = ct−Ht
and write the problem in a recursive formulation. State variables at time t include
the endogenous variables {zt, nt, bt} and the exogenous variable θt. I can write the
optimization problem as follows:








V CEt+1 (zt+1, nt+1, bt+1, θt+1)
]
s.t. cht + hzt + Ψ(zt+1, zt) + qtnt+1 + bt+1 = θtztn
α
t + qtnt + (1 + r)bt,
−bt+1 ≤ φqt.
The maximization problem yields the following optimality conditions for each
13




′ (cht ) (1.9)
λCEt Ψ1,t = βEt
[
λCEt+1 (θt+1 − h−Ψ2,t+1)
]
(1.10)
λCEt qt = βEt
[
















. λCEt and µ
CE
t are Lagrangian mul-
tipliers associated with the budget constraint and collateral constraint, respectively.
Condition (1.9) is the marginal valuation of wealth for households. Condition
(1.10) is the key equation for growth in this model, where private agents equate the
marginal cost of choosing zt+1 with the marginal benefit. The cost is reflected in the
partial derivative of the technology function Ψ1,t, while the benefit includes a future
output θt+1, excluding the normalized future subsistence level of consumption, h and
the partial derivative of future technology function, Ψ2,t+1. The marginal cost and
marginal benefit are evaluated at the marginal valuation of wealth in periods t and
t + 1 respectively. The third condition (1.11) is a standard asset pricing function,
where holding productive asset nt+1 yields a dividend income αθt+1zt+1 and capital
gains qt+1. The last condition (1.12) is the Euler equation for holding bonds. The
additional term µCEt captures the effect of collateral constraint on the external bor-
rowing. When the collateral constraint (1.5) binds, the marginal benefit of borrowing
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to increase consumption exceeds the expected marginal cost by an amount equal to
the shadow price of relaxing collateral constraint µCEt .
Normalized Economy: To solve for a stationary equilibrium, I normalize all the




, where xt = {cht , bt, qt, V CEt , · · · }, and endogenous growth rate gt+1 =
zt+1
zt
. The normalized equilibrium conditions are given in Appendix A.3.
1.3 Optimal Macroprudential Policy
Consistent with the literature, there is a role for macroprudential policy in the
economy due to the presence of pecuniary externalities (see Lorenzoni (2008) and
Dávila and Korinek (2017)).10 These pecuniary externalities are related to a vicious
cycle associated with the collateral borrowing constraints. Intuitively, private agents
need to cut spending when a negative shock hits and the constraints bind. However,
asset prices fall with a decline in spending, and private agents need to cut spending
further due to lower collateral values and tighter borrowing constraints. Therefore,
the initial shock is endogenously amplified through the constraints. Importantly,
private agents, taking the asset price as given, fail to internalize their contributions
10Pecuniary externalities refer to externalities associated with prices. In an economy with incom-
plete markets, allocations with pecuniary externalities are generically sub-optimal. For a detailed
proof, see early contributions by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1986).
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to this vicious cycle, which represents pecuniary externalities in the economy. As a
result, they over-borrow in normal periods. The optimal macroprudential policy is
designed to correct this over-borrowing in the credit market.
Following the literature, I first define the social planner’s problem and then choose
macroprudential policy to implement the allocation (see Jeanne and Korinek (2010b),
Bianchi (2011), and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018)). This is similar to the “primal ap-
proach” in optimal policy analysis (originally from Stiglitz (1982)), in which the social
planner can choose allocations subject to resource, implementability, and collateral
constraints. This formulation allows me to see the wedge between the social plan-
ner and private agents in choosing allocations and understand the inefficiencies in
the economy. To implement the social planner’s allocation, I consider what tax or
subsidy with lump-sum transfers is needed to close the wedge. In this case, a tax on
capital flows is needed.
Specifically, I consider the social planner who chooses allocations on behalf of the
representative household subject to the same constraints as private agents, but who
lacks the ability to commit to future policies. Importantly, I assume that the asset
price qt remains market-determined and that the Euler equation of asset price (1.11)
enters the social planner’s problem as an implementability constraint. The implicit
rationale is that the social planner cannot directly intervene with respect to the asset
price but internalizes how the allocations affect it and thus the collateral constraint.11
11I do not allow the social planner to trade assets on behalf of private agents. One rationale is
that private agents are better than the planner at observing fundamental payoffs of financial assets
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Furthermore, I assume that endogenous productivity zt+1 is chosen by private
agents and that the Euler equation of productivity (1.10) also enters the social plan-
ner’s problem as an additional implementability constraint. This is because I use
macroprudential policy to decentralize this social planner’s allocation and the policy
is designed to correct the wedge only in the bond holdings. To correct other wedges,
such as that in productivity, an additional instrument is needed. I analyze this case
in Section 1.6.
I call the social planner with macroprudential policy a macroprudential social
planner and denote her allocation with a superscript “MP”. As described before, the
maximization problem can be written as








V MPt+1 (zt+1, bt+1, θt+1)
]
s.t. cht + hzt + Ψ(zt+1, zt) + bt+1 = θtzt + (1 + r)bt,
−bt+1 ≤ φqt,
u′(cht )qt = βEt
[




u′(cht )Ψ1,t = βEt
[




where equations (1.13) and (1.14) are two implementation constraints, i.e., the Euler
equations of choosing productive assets and productivity. I write implementation
constraints as functions of future endogenous state variables zt+1 and bt+1, since I
(see Jeanne and Korinek (2010b)).
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want to solve for time-consistent policy functions as in Bianchi and Mendoza (2018).
Given the definition of the macroprudential social planner, it is straightforward
to define constrained inefficiency as follows:
Definition 1. Constrained Inefficiency
The competitive equilibrium displays constrained inefficiency if it differs from the
allocation chosen by the macroprudential social planner.
To understand the difference between private agents and the macroprudential
social planner, I derive the optimality conditions of MP as follows:
λMPt = u
′(cht )− ξMPt u′′(cht )qt − νMPt u′′(cht )Ψ1,t (1.15)
λMPt Ψ1,t − ξMPt G1,t − νMPt
[















t G2,t + ν
MP





















, and I2,t =
∂I(zt+1,bt+1)
∂bt+1




t , and ν
MP
t are Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the budget constraint, collateral constraint, and two im-
plementation constraints, respectively.
Wedge in Marginal Valuation of Wealth: The main difference between CE and
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MP is reflected in the marginal valuation of wealth, λCEt and λ
MP
t . One can see that
the wedge includes two terms due to the presence of implementation constraints: The
first term is −ξMPt u′′(cht )qt, which captures pecuniary externalities in the economy,
and the second term is −νMPt u′′(cht )Ψ1,t, which captures the inability of the social
planner to change zt+1. Consistent with results in the literature, the first term is
positive due to condition (1.17). Uniquely, I also have the second term with νMPt ,
which is the shadow price of implementation constraint (1.14). The value of νMPt
is given by the optimality condition (1.16). Quantitatively, it is small. Hence, the
wedge −ξMPt u′′(cht )qt − νMPt u′′(cht )Ψ1,t is positive.
Due to this wedge, the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient, and the
social planner chooses a different allocation than do private agents. However, the
difference appears only when the constraint is slack. The reason is that the social
planner cannot change the allocation when the constraint binds. In the period when
the collateral constraint is slack, i.e., µMPt = 0, the social planner chooses a higher





(see the optimality conditions of bond holding in CE and MP, (1.12) and
(1.18)).12 Hence, there is an over-borrowing issue in competitive equilibrium, consis-
tent with the literature.
Implementation: I assume that the planner has access to a macroprudential tax
12Quantitatively, the term νMPt u
′′(cht )Ψ1,t + ν
MP
t I2,t is small.
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τMP,bt on capital flows and a lump-sum transfer T
MP
t . The budget constraint for
private agents becomes




bt+1 = yt + qtnt + (1 + r) bt + T
MP
t
where TMPt = −τ
MP,b
t bt+1.
Proposition 1. Decentralization with Macroprudential Policy
The macroprudential social planner’s allocation can be implemented by a macropru-
dential tax τMP,bt on capital flows that is rebated to private agents with a lump-sum
transfer TMPt . Furthermore, the tax τ
MP,b
t is given by
τMP,bt =





























)γ − ν̂MPt g−1−γt+1 Î2,t(
ĉht
)−γ
Proof. See Appendix A.4.1.
Consistent with the literature, a macroprudential tax τMP,bt is used to correct the
wedge between λMPt and λ
CE
t . It is positive in the quantitative exercise, since the
Lagrangian multiplier νMPt is small. Hence macroprudential policy is also used to
correct the over-borrowing issue in the economy.
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1.4 Calibration
This section first describes an 11-year event window that the model targets. It
then shows parameter values and the model’s ability to fit the data.
1.4.1 Targeted Event Window
One key feature of the model is its generation of such persistent output-level
effects of financial crises as found in the data (see Cerra and Saxena (2008), Rogoff
and Reinhart (2009), and Ball (2014)). To quantify the magnitude of output cost
for later calibration, I construct an 11-year event window of output growth rates
centering on one specific type of financial crisis in emerging markets, i.e., sudden stop
episodes.13 These episodes occur when there is a sudden slowdown in private capital
inflows to emerging market economies and a corresponding sharp reversal in current
account balances. For the identification of sudden stops, I use the episodes in Calvo et
al. (2006) (“Calvo episodes”), whose criterion is based on a sharp reversal in current
account balances and a spike in spreads. For robustness, I also use episodes identified
in Korinek and Mendoza (2014) (“KM episodes”) and report the results in Appendix
A.2.
The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows that the growth rate of real GDP per capita is
a stationary process and falls to −5.65 percent at the time of crises. I also construct
an event window for “Total Factor Productivity (TFP)” in the right panel of Figure
13The source of real GDP per capita is explained in Appendix A.1.
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1.1 and find that productivity displays a similar pattern to output, consistent with
the predictions of my model.
Figure 1.1: Growth Rates in Sudden Stop Episodes (%)
Note: The series are constructed using an 11-year window centering on the sudden stop episodes.
1.4.2 Parameter Values
I calibrate the model to annual frequency using 55 countries’ data from between
1961 and 2015 (see Appendix A.1 for details). The model can be solved using a
variant of the endogenous gridpoint method, as in Carroll (2006) (see Appendix A.6
for details). There is only one shock in the economy: the exogenous technology
shock θt, which follows the process below. I discretize the process using Rouwenhorst
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method as in Kopecky and Suen (2010).
log θt = ρ log θt−1 + εt, where εt ∼ N(0, σ2)
where ρ and σ are persistence and volatility of the shock, and εt is a random variable
following a normal distribution.
It is important to have the shock θt in the model to capture the fall of output
growth during crises, as seen in Figure 1.1. Without a fall in θt, one cannot explain the
negative output growth rate in crises, since output yt depends on the predetermined
productivity zt and the exogenous productivity θt.
14 Furthermore, the endogenous
response of productivity zt+1 prevents the output growth rate after crises from being
higher than its long-run average, consistent with the event window.15














where ψ > 0 and zt+1
zt
≥ ψ.
I impose a simple quadratic form on Ψ(zt+1, zt) so as to calibrate my model.
14Admittedly, other shocks, such as financial shocks and interest rate shocks, are important for
understanding financial crises. However, these shocks alone cannot lead to a drop of output growth
in crises in the model, since the productivity zt is predetermined.
15One could also have an exogenous trend shock, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Introducing
an exogenous trend shock, however, does not allow me to analyze the policy’s impact on growth.
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Given that this way of modeling growth is generic, I calibrate the parameter values
in the function by reference to some moments in the data. For example, κ is a
scale parameter and is used to match the average share of consumption in GDP. The
parameter ψ is the minimum level of endogenous growth gt+1 in the model and is
used to match the output growth rate after crises in the targeted event window.
I need to assign values to 10 parameters in the model: {β, r, γ, h, ψ, κ, α, ρ, σ, φ}.
The calibration proceeds in two steps. First, some parameter values are standard
in the literature. For example, I choose the interest rate r to be 6 percent and the
coefficient of risk aversion parameter γ to be 2. The parameter α equals productive
asset income’s share of total income, and I choose 0.2 following Jeanne and Korinek
(2010b). Second, given these parameter values, I jointly choose the remaining pa-
rameters to match relevant moments in the data and the targeted event window in
Figure 1.1.
Specifically, I use the following parameters to match data moments. Parameter β
determines the incentive to borrow and is chosen to match the long-run Net Foreign
Asset (NFA) to GDP ratio (−30 percent). Parameter ρ is chosen to match the
correlation between the current account and output at −0.25, since I focus on the
relationship between capital flows and output growth.16 Parameter φ determines the
maximum value of borrowing in the economy and thus the probability of crises.17 In
16Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that the persistence of shocks governs the correlation between
the current account and output. The correlation is constructed by first de-trending the output series
with a HP filter and then calculating the correlation between the current account to GDP ratio and
the cyclical component of output.
17I calibrate the model such that the collateral constraint marginally binds in the long run and
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the model, I define crisis episodes as periods when constraints bind and the magnitude
of current account reversal exceeds 1 standard deviation of its long-run average (see
Bianchi (2011)). The parameter φ is chosen to match the probability of crises at
5.5 percent, a standard value in the literature (see Bianchi (2011) and Eichengreen
et al. (2008)). Furthermore, parameters h and κ are jointly chosen to match the
average growth rate, 2.3 percent, and the share of consumption in GDP, 77.6 percent.
Specifically, h and κ have to satisfy the normalized resource constraint (1.8) and the





) = 1 +







where the average value of θt is normalized at 1, and the value of h and κ depend on
the value of β and ψ.18
As explained before, I also want to match the event window in Figure 1.1. The
volatility σ governs the minimum level of the exogenous shock θt and thus the decline
in the output growth rate during crises. Parameter ψ determines the minimum level








18Here, I calibrate the economy so that in the long run it is unconstrained and the collateral
constraint marginally binds.
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of the endogenous growth rate gt+1 and thus the decline in the output growth rate
one year after crises. Therefore, I choose σ and ψ to jointly match the output growth
rate during crises (−5.65 percent) and one period after crises (3.28 percent) in the
event window.
In sum, given values of {r, γ, α, η}, I pick values of {β, ψ, ρ, σ}, which determine
values of {φ, κ, h}. I then simulate the model, calculate moments of the simulated
data, construct an event window as in Figure 1.1, and then compare the simulation
results with the actual data moments and the targeted event window.19 The values
of all parameters are reported in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Calibration
Value Source/target
Parameter in production function α = 0.2 Jeanne and Korinek (2010b)
Risk-free interest rate r = 6% Benigno et al. (2013)
Risk aversion γ = 2 Standard in the literature
Volatility of technology shock σ = 0.04 Output growth rate at time of crises = −5.65 %
Parameter in Ψ functions ψ = 0.95 Output growth rate one year after crises = 3.28%
Parameter in Ψ functions κ = 26.29 Consumption-GDP ratio = 77.6%
Subsistence level parameter h = 0.51 Average GDP growth = 2.3%
Discount rate β = 0.968 Probability of crisis = 5.5%
Persistence of technology shock ρ = 0.83 Correlation between current account and output = −0.25
Collateral constraint parameter φ = 0.0852 NFA-GDP ratio = −30%
19In particular, I simulate the model for 11,000 periods and throw away the first 1000 periods.
Data moments are calculated based on the remaining 10,000 periods of simulated data. Furthermore,
I identify crisis episodes in the simulated data and calculate the average output growth rate during
crises and one period after crises.
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1.4.3 Model Performance
Table 1.2 reports model and data moments. One can see that the model is able
to match targeted moments in the data. As other models with occasionally binding
collateral constraints, crisis episodes are rare events in my model and occur with a
probability of 6.2 percent in the simulation.
Table 1.2: Moments: Data and Model
Targeted Moments Data Model
Average GDP growth (%) 2.30 2.31
Probability of crisis (%) 5.50 6.23
NFA-GDP ratio (%) −30.00 −27.18
Consumption-GDP ratio (%) 77.6 77.53
Correlation between current account and output −0.25 −0.22
Unlike existing models in the literature, my model can generate the growth rate
dynamics in Figure 1.1. To see this, I simulate the model, identify crisis episodes and
construct an 11-period event window for different variables in Figure 1.2. Not surpris-
ingly, crises occur when there is a large drop in the exogenous shock θt. The current
account experiences a large reversal because the borrowing constraints bind and pri-
vate agents have to cut their external borrowing, i.e., an increase in b̂t+1. Furthermore,
these events are accompanied by a decline in spending such as consumption ĉt and
growth-enhancing expenditures (reflected in a decline in the endogenous growth rate
gt+1). The asset price q̂t also drops, which leads to an amplification effect through
collateral constraints. Fortunately, my model captures the empirical regularity of
crises. Importantly, it can capture the persistent output-level effects of crises as in
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the data: Output growth rates fall during crises with a decline in θt and only go back
to the long-run average level after crises. This occurs because the endogenous growth
rate gt+1 decreases during crises.
Figure 1.2: Event Window: Model and Data
1.5 Quantitative Results
In this section, I first compare the allocations of private agents and of the macro-
prudential social planner, and then analyze policy impacts on average growth. I also
28
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL STABILITY, GROWTH AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
calculate welfare gains from macroprudential policy and compare these values with
the literature. Lastly, I analyze the size of macroprudential taxes. In Appendix A.5,
I conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the results.
1.5.1 Comparing CE and MP Allocations
The difference between the macroprudential social planner and private agents is
captured by policy functions. Figure 1.3 plots consumption ĉht , endogenous growth
rate gt+1, asset price q̂t, and bond holding b̂t+1 for the competitive equilibrium (red
solid line) and the macroprudential social planner (green dashed line) over the bond
holding b̂t when θt is 2 standard deviations below its long-run average.
20
There are kinks in all policy functions due to the presence of the collateral con-
straint. When the economy starts from a lower bond holding b̂t (a higher debt to
repay), the collateral constraint binds, and private agents have to cut external bor-
rowing and total spending. As a result, both consumption and growth are reduced.
Consistent with the literature, there is an over-borrowing phenomenon in the
competitive equilibrium because the social planner chooses a higher bond holding
b̂t+1 than do private agents. Unlike in the literature, the over-borrowing also has an
implication for the endogenous growth rate: The social planner chooses a lower gt+1
20I choose θt to be at 2 standard deviations below its long-run average because the economy
in competitive equilibrium converges to a marginally unconstrained steady state in the absence of
future shocks in θt. Hence, any small shock to θt pushes the economy into a constrained state, i.e.,
a crisis episode.
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when the constraint is slack.
Figure 1.4 displays the ergodic distributions of bond holding b̂t+1 and endogenous
growth rate gt+1. Compared with private agents, the macroprudential social planner
borrows less and thus chooses more mass in the range of higher bond holdings. In
terms of the ergodic distribution for gt+1, the social planner has less mass at both
extremely low and normal (around 2 percent) growth levels. One can see that the
dispersion of growth for MP has been marginally reduced. However, it is unclear
whether average growth has been increased or decreased.
To see the impact of macroprudential policy on average growth and the probability
of crisis, Table 1.3 reports model moments for the social planner and private agents.
With macroprudential policy, external borrowing is reduced from 27.18 percent to
25.78 percent, which lowers average growth from 2.315 percent to 2.307 percent.
However, the policy also reduces the probability of crisis from 6.23 percent to 1.89
percent. Hence, the economy becomes more resilient.
Table 1.3: Moments: CE and MP
Moments CE MP
Average GDP growth (%) 2.315 2.307
Probability of crisis (%) 6.23 1.89
NFA-GDP ratio (%) −27.18 −25.78
Consumption-GDP ratio (%) 77.53 77.65
Correlation between current account and output −0.22 −0.37
Figure 1.5 reports the event window as before but also plots the dynamics of
variables for the social planner given the same exogenous shock θt. One can see that
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the probability of crisis has been reduced by the social planner in the last panel of
Figure 1.5. Furthermore, the planner chooses a higher bond holding in normal periods
and thus suffers less when the really big shock hits at time 0. As a result, the social
planner cuts consumption and growth-enhancing expenditures less during crises.
However, macroprudential policy also reduces borrowing and thus the endogenous
growth in normal periods. To show its impact, Figure 1.6 plots the transition dynam-
ics from competitive equilibrium to the equilibrium chosen by the social planner.21 On
balance, the macroprudential social planner borrows less than private agents, which
reduces both consumption and endogenous growth. However, the economy becomes
more resilient and has a lower probability of crisis. Therefore, consumption converges
to a higher level. But the endogenous growth rate gt+1 only converges to a lower level
because the economy borrows less in the long run.
1.5.2 Policy Impacts on Average Growth
This model allows for an analysis of policy impacts on average growth. It is clear
that macroprudential policy increases the endogenous growth rate gt+1 during crises
but reduces it in normal periods. Even though the policy lowers the volatility of
growth unambiguously, its impacts on average growth are ambiguous in theory.
In the baseline calibration, there is a negative relationship between average growth
21The transition dynamics is constructed by first running 1,000 simulations of 1,020 periods for
competitive equilibrium and then introducing the social planner from period 1,001.
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and financial stability for macroprudential policy. But a more general question is
which parameters govern this relationship. To answer this question, I proceed by
simplifying the model such that it can almost completely be solved analytically.
Instead of using the existing log AR(1) process for θt, I assume that θt = 1 for
all t, and that it falls to 0.9 in the second period, with a probability p ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, the economy is unconstrained in a steady state, and I need to change
β such that β(1 + r)g−γss = 1, where gss = 1.023, as in the baseline calibration. I keep
other parameter values the same as before. Hence, crisis occurs in the economy when
θ2 = 0.9 and the collateral constraint binds.
I plot the average growth chosen by the private agents and by the social planner
in Figure 1.7.22 Whether the social planner increases or decreases average growth
depends on two parameters: The probability of negative shock p and the tightness
of the collateral constraint φ. Intuitively, the macroprudential social planner can
increase average growth because she reduces the cost of crisis and thus raises the
growth rate during a crisis. However, a crisis occurs with probability p, and its cost
depends on the tightness of the collateral constraint. When p is higher or φ is lower,
macroprudential policy is very beneficial, since the expected cost of crisis is relatively
large. Hence, the policy can increase average growth in these scenarios.
22 I run 100-period simulations in two separate states to calculate average growth: θ2 = 0.9 in





100 , where i ∈ {H,L}
Therefore, average growth is p ∗GL + (1− p) ∗GH .
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I also find that the magnitude of the impacts is small (see Figure 1.7 and Table
1.3). This is because there is an optimal rate of growth defined by the technology
Ψ(zt+1, zt). Macroprudential policy does not change this function directly but only
changes the marginal valuation of wealth. Furthermore, any changes in the growth
rate have non-trivial effects on welfare (see Lucas (1987) and Barlevy (2004)). Hence,
if the optimal policy has to affect growth negatively in order to increase financial
stability, a planner will tend to choose a policy that changes growth only by a small
amount. Otherwise, it is too costly for social welfare.
1.5.3 Welfare Gains
To calculate the welfare gains from macroprudential policy, I define a variable
∆MP (b̂t, θt), which compares two utilities and converts their difference into consump-
tion equivalents:
∆MP (b̂t, θt) = 100






where V̂ i(b̂t, θt) is a normalized value function and i ∈ {CE,MP}.
∆MP (b̂t, θt) depends on state variables {b̂t, θt}, and I plot it in Figure 1.8.23 Con-
sistent with the literature, it peaks in the region where the magnitude of externalities
is at its maximum. It becomes smaller when the economy has a higher amount of
bond holding, since the probability of future crisis is lower. It also becomes smaller
when the economy has a lower amount of bond holding, i.e. when the constraint
binds. The macroprudential social planner chooses the same allocation as the private
23Like the policy functions, ∆MP (b̂t, θt) is plotted over the bond space b̂t when the shock θt is 2
standard deviations below its long-run average.
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agents in these regions. Hence, the welfare gains are small.
To understand the average benefit of macroprudential policy, I also define a vari-
able EV MP as follows:





where the expectation is taken using the ergodic distribution of b̂t and θt in compet-
itive equilibrium.
The unconditional welfare gains from the macroprudential social planner EV MP
are equivalent to a 0.06 percent permanent increase in annual consumption, the same
range as in the literature. Hence, endogenous growth does not fundamentally change
the benefit of macroprudential policy.
To understand the reason, I decompose the overall welfare gains into two chan-
nels: One is a cyclical component of consumption ĉht , a traditional channel as in the
literature, and the other is a trend component of consumption, i.e., productivity zt,
a new channel with endogenous growth. Specifically, utilities depend on the net con-
sumption series {cht }∞t=0, which in turn is the product of the cyclical component of
consumption {ĉht }∞t=0 and the trend component of consumption {zt}∞t=0. The difference
between endogenous and exogenous growth is whether policies can affect the trend
component of consumption. If I find that gains come through the cyclical rather than
the trend component of consumption, it is not surprising that endogenous growth
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does not fundamentally change the benefit of optimal policy.
To accomplish that, I run 1,000 simulations and get both cyclical and trend com-
ponents of consumption for the competitive equilibrium and the social planner. To
control for the trend (cyclical) component of the consumption channel, I multiply
the trend (cyclical) component of consumption in competitive equilibrium by the
cyclical (trend) component of consumption under the social planner to construct a
counter-factual consumption. I then compare the utility of this counter-factual con-
sumption with the utility of consumption in competitive equilibrium. The difference
between these two is considered as gains through the cyclical (trend) component of
consumption channel.
Table 1.4 reports the results. Indeed, gains through the cyclical component of
consumption channel are reinforced by endogenous growth: a 0.40 percent perma-
nent increase in annual consumption, which is much larger than those found in the
literature. However, there are welfare losses through the trend component of the con-
sumption channel, since the policy reduces average growth. Even if the magnitude of
reduction is small, 0.01 percentage point, the cost in terms of welfare is large, a 0.34
percent permanent decrease in annual consumption. Overall, macroprudential policy
is still desirable, but the gains are no larger than those in the models with exogenous
growth.
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Table 1.4: Source of Welfare Gains (%)
Overall Trend Consumption Channel Cyclical Consumption Channel
MP 0.06 −0.34 0.40
1.5.4 Policy Instruments
Figure 1.9 shows the macroprudential tax on capital flows τMP,bt .
24 The tax rate
varies from 0 to 5 percent, depending on the state variable b̂t, and I find that it is 1.28
percent on average. As explained before, the macroprudential social planner cannot
change the allocation when the constraint binds, and I set the tax rate at zero in
these regions. Consistent with the literature, the tax rate peaks in the region where
the magnitude of externalities is at its maximum. The tax approaches zero when the
economy has sufficient bond holdings b̂t.
1.6 Extension: Other Policy Instruments
In this section, I introduce a social planner who has two instruments. For the
sake of comparison, I call her a multi-instrument social planner (MI). Unlike the
macroprudential social planner, who only has one instrument to influence the level
of spending, the multi-instrument social planner can also change the composition of
spending. Hence, an additional policy is needed to implement her allocation. As I
24As before, I plot it over the bond holding b̂t when the shock θt is 2 standard deviations below
its long-run average.
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will explain later, this new policy can be interpreted as a stimulus policy.
Like the macroprudential social planner, the multi-instrument social planner chooses
allocation on behalf of private agents subject to the resource constraint (1.8) and the
collateral constraint (1.5). Differently, she only has the asset equation (1.11) as an
implementation constraint, not the growth equation (1.10). Therefore, she can choose
zt+1 without restrictions. Specifically, her maximization problem can be written as








V MIt+1 (zt+1, bt+1, θt+1)
]
s.t. cht + hzt + Ψ(zt+1, zt) + bt+1 = θtzt + (1 + r)bt,
−bt+1 ≤ φqt,
u′(cht )qt = βEt
[




where the last constraint is the Euler equation of choosing a productive asset.
The maximization problem implies the following optimality conditions for each
period:
λMIt = u
′(cht )− ξMIt u′′(cht )qt
λMIt Ψ1,t = ξ
MI
t G1,t + βEt
[
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where λMIt , µ
MI
t , and ξ
MI
t are Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget con-
straint, collateral constraint, and implementation constraint, respectively.
Wedge in Marginal Valuation of Wealth: The main difference between CE
and MI is reflected in the marginal valuation of wealth, λCEt and λ
MI
t . Like the
macroprudential social planner, the multi-instrument social planner values wealth
more than private agents do, due to the term −ξMIt u′′(cht )qt, capturing pecuniary
externalities in the economy. Unlike the macroprudential social planner, she can
choose productivity freely, as in equation (1.21), and does not have an additional
term in the wedge, as in λMPt − λCEt .
The wedge in the marginal valuation of wealth also has an implication for external
borrowing and growth. Unlike the macroprudential social planner, who is constrained
to implement the same allocation as private agents when the constraint binds, the
multi-instrument social planner shifts spending from growth-enhancing expenditures
to consumption. By doing so, she can increase the asset price and thus relax the
collateral constraint. When the collateral constraint is slack, she borrows less, for the
same reason as the macroprudential social planner does. However, she also chooses
a higher growth rate than do private agents so as to offset the negative effect of de-
creased borrowing on growth.
Implementation: I assume that the social planner has access to a tax τMI,bt on
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capital flows, a subsidy τMI,zt on growth-enhancing expenditures, and a lump-sum
transfer TMIt . The budget constraint of private agents becomes








bt+1 = yt + qtnt + (1 + r) bt + T
MI
t
where TMIt = −τ
MI,z
t Ψ(zt+1, zt)− τ
MI,b
t bt+1.
Proposition 2. Decentralization with Two Instruments
The multi-instrument social planner’s allocation can be implemented by a tax τMI,bt on
capital flows and a subsidy τMI,zt on growth-enhancing expenditures, which are rebated



























































Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.






to close the wedge between λMIt and λ
CE
t
on allocations, since it affects two decision margins in the economy. Both instruments
are used ex-ante and ex-post. The only instrument I call macroprudential policy is
39
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL STABILITY, GROWTH AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
the ex-ante capital flow tax τMI,bt , the instrument that is available to the macropru-
dential social planner in the benchmark analysis. When the tax is used ex-post, I
call it a stimulus policy, a category which also includes the subsidy τMI,zt on growth-
enhancing expenditures. Hence, the stimulus policy can be used for both ex-ante and
ex-post intervention. The reason that the ex-ante growth subsidy τMI,zt also belongs
to the stimulus policy is that the multi-instrument social planner uses it to offset the
negative effect of ex-ante capital flows tax τMI,bt on growth.
Discussion on the Two Social Planners: The main difference between the two
social planners is the availability of instruments, which is related to the on-going
policy debate on ex-ante versus ex-post policy intervention. The macroprudential
social planner only intervenes ex-ante, while the multi-instrument social planner in-
tervenes both ex-ante and ex-post. I choose the macroprudential social planner as the
benchmark analysis to stay in line with the literature and to focus on the differences
between exogenous and endogenous growth.
Furthermore, macroprudential policy is more realistic and relevant for an emerging
market to use to smooth boom-bust cycles in capital flows. Empirical results on the
effectiveness of macroprudential policy are mostly supportive. For example, Lim et
al. (2011) and Bruno et al. (2017) have estimated the effectiveness of macroprudential
tools using comprehensive data and argue that such tools are effective in reducing
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the pro-cyclicality of shocks (see Galati and Moessner (2017) for a summary).25
The stimulus policy, however, is hard to implement. In my model, it includes an
ex-ante growth subsidy and an ex-post policy intervention. For the ex-post interven-
tion, both capital flow taxes and growth subsidies are used to change the composition
of spending in order to raise asset prices and relax the borrowing constraint. Such
intervention is required during crises and potentially incurs some cost (see Jeanne
and Korinek (2013) and Benigno et al. (2016)). The ex-ante growth subsidy is used
to correct pecuniary externalities rather than externalities in endogenous growth, as
in the literature. But there exists a fundamental implementation issue because one
needs to identify the source of economic growth—i.e., Ψ(zt, zt+1)—in order to impose
the subsidy. The identification failure typically leads to the futility of a subsidy pol-
icy. Indeed, there is little evidence for positive effects of subsidies on productivity
(see Westmore (2013)).
1.6.1 Comparing CE, MP, and MI Allocations
Figure 1.10 compares policy functions of CE, MP, and MI. Unlike private agents
and the macroprudential social planner, the multi-instrument social planner can shift
resources from growth-enhancing expenditures to consumption when the collateral
25There are exceptions. For example, Fernández et al. (2015) cast some doubts on the effectiveness
of macroprudential policies, since they find the instruments are acyclical, which counters the theoret-
ical predictions for prudential tools. Policies’ effectiveness depends crucially on their design. There
are issues that might affect their effectiveness. For example, Bengui and Bianchi (2014) investigate
the issue of leakage, and Dogra (2014) investigates the issue of private information.
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constraint binds. This behavior comes at a second-order cost, since it distorts the
first-order conditions of private agents in choosing bond holdings and productivity.
However, there is a first-order gain, because it increases the asset price q̂t and thus
relaxes the collateral constraint. As a result, the social planner can borrow more
even during a crisis, and the crisis is not as costly as in competitive equilibrium; one
can see that consumption ĉht , endogenous growth gt+1, and asset price q̂t are much
higher. The multi-instrument social planner’s allocation in crisis also has implications
for her allocation in normal periods: She actually chooses fewer bond holdings and
a higher endogenous growth rate than do private agents, and the constraint becomes
binding with a higher level of bond. Hence, the economy ends up with more financial
instability.
Figure 1.11 plots the ergodic distributions of bond holdings and endogenous
growth rate. Unlike the macroprudential social planner, the multi-instrument so-
cial planner chooses more mass in the range of lower bond holdings b̂t+1. Like the
macroprudential social planner, she also has less mass at both extremely low and
normal (around 2 percent) growth levels than at the competitive equilibrium. As a
result, the dispersion of growth has been reduced, but the effect on average growth is
unclear.
Table 1.5 reports model moments of CE, MP, and MI. From the economy in CE
to MI, the probability of crisis has increased from 6.2 percent to 14.2 percent, and
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average growth is reduced by 0.03 percentage point. This is counter-intuitive but
reasonable because the crisis is less costly with the stimulus policy and the social
planner strikes a new balance between impatience and precautionary motive. Given
that the private agent is impatient, the social planner finds it optimal to borrow more
and hit the collateral constraint more frequently, since she can intervene ex-post to
reduce the cost of crisis. But the ex-post intervention requires a shift of spending
from growth-enhancing expenditures to consumption. As a result, average growth
rate is even lower in MI than in MP.
Table 1.5: Moments: CE, MP, and MI
Moments CE MP MI
Average GDP growth (%) 2.315 2.307 2.289
Probability of crisis (%) 6.23 1.89 14.23
NFA-GDP ratio (%) −27.18 −25.78 −28.98
Consumption-GDP ratio (%) 77.53 77.65 77.58
Correlation between current account and output −0.22 −0.37 −0.54
Even if the multi-instrument social planner lowers average growth, she can still
smooth the economy. Figure 1.12 reports the event window as before. One can see
that consumption and asset prices fall less in MI than in CE and MP during crises.
Furthermore, the endogenous growth rate gt+1 during crises falls less in MI than in
CE but more than in MP because the social planner shifts resources from growth-
enhancing expenditures to consumption. Due to the existence of ex-post intervention,
the social planner borrows more ex-ante and hits the borrowing constraint more
frequently.
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Unlike the macroprudential social planner, who increases endogenous growth gt+1
during the crisis but reduces it in normal periods, the multi-instrument planner ac-
tually increases endogenous growth gt+1 in the short run but reduces it in the long
run. To demonstrate the difference, I show the transition dynamics in Figure 1.13.
The multi-instrument social planner generates a short-run boom in consumption
and growth, since she can intervene ex-post and thus borrows more ex-ante. However,
growth converges to a lower level in the long run because resources are used to serve a
higher level of external debt. Therefore, the multi-instrument social planner actually
faces a trade-off between short and long-run growth. Furthermore, I find that the
short-run boom in average growth lasts for 18 years.
1.6.2 Policy Impacts on Average Growth: MI and
MP
Given that the multi-instrument social planner has access to the stimulus policy,
one natural question is whether she can increase average growth. To answer this
question, Figure 1.14 shows average growth in the simplified version of the model,
as before. One can see that the social planner indeed increases average growth all
the time. The stimulus policy allows the social planner to intervene ex-post, which
mitigates the cost of crises. Furthermore, the stimulus policy also offsets the negative
effect of macroprudential policy on growth in normal periods. Therefore, average
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growth is increased for the multi-instrument social planner.26
1.6.3 Welfare Gains: MI and MP
Unsurprisingly, the multi-instrument social planner generates larger welfare gains
than does the macroprudential social planner thanks to the availability of stimulus
policy. Figure 1.15 plots conditional welfare gains. The gains become larger when
the constraint binds tighter (a lower bond b̂t), reflecting the importance of stimulus
policy.
Average welfare gains are equivalent to a 0.24 percent permanent increase in
annual consumption, and the source of the gains is the cyclical component of the
consumption channel, as before (see Table 1.6). Furthermore, the gains from this
channel do not increase with two instruments. Instead, the welfare loss in the trend
component of the consumption channel is significantly reduced, from a 34 percent to
a 13 percent permanent decrease in annual consumption. Hence, the stimulus policy
reduces the negative impact of macroprudential policy on growth and thus on welfare.
26The results are different from our baseline calibration, where average growth for the multi-
instrument social planner is decreased. As I explained before, given that the cost of financial crisis is
reduced, the social planner finds it optimal to hit the borrowing constraint more frequently. Average
growth rate is thus reduced because the resources are shifted from growth-enhancing expenditures
towards consumption. However, this channel is not in the simplified version of the model since the
probability of crisis is given by the exogenous parameter p.
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Table 1.6: Source of Welfare Gains (%): MP and MI
Overall Trend Consumption Channel Cyclical Consumption Channel
MP 0.06 −0.34 0.40








over the bond space b̂t when θt is 2 standard
deviations below its long-run average. For the capital flow tax τMI,bt , one can see
that it is positive when the constraint is slack (used ex-ante), just as it is for the
macroprudential social planner. However, when the initial wealth is low (i.e., b̂t is
low and the constraint binds), the tax becomes negative, meaning that the social
planner wants to encourage borrowing. This is because she can relax the constraint
in the bad state and thus borrow more than private agents. The growth subsidy τMI,zt
is positive in normal periods, since the social planner wants the stimulus policy to
offset the negative effect of macroprudential policy on growth. When the constraint
binds, it is negative, since the social planner wants to shift resources from growth-
enhancing expenditures to consumption so as to relax the borrowing constraint.
Table 1.7 reports the average of capital flows tax and growth subsidy. I find
that, on average, capital flow tax is 1.12 percent. The ex-ante tax-macroprudential
policy—is 1.1 percent, and the ex-post tax is 1.19 percent. The growth subsidy, on
average, is 1.00 percent. The ex-ante subsidy is 1.87 percent, and the ex-post subsidy
is −1.78 percent. Based on these results, one might argue that the existence of ex-post
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intervention reduces the magnitude of ex-ante intervention, as in Jeanne and Korinek
(2013). However, this result depends on calibrations (see the sensitivity analysis in
Appendix A.5).
Table 1.7: Policy Instruments (%): MP and MI
Capital Flows Tax Growth Subsidy
MP 1.28 N.A.
MI 1.12 1.00
MI (Ex-ante) 1.10 1.87
MI (Ex-post) 1.19 −1.78
1.7 Conclusion
This paper introduces endogenous growth into a model with occasionally binding
collateral constraints of the type that has been used previously in the literature on
macroprudential policy. In the previous literature, binding constraints did not have a
long-run impact on output. By contrast, in my model, they do, which increases their
cost and presumably might reinforce the case for macroprudential policy. My model
thus lends itself to analyzing the role of macroprudential policy in the context of a
tradeoff between growth and financial stability.
The impact of macroprudential policy on average growth is, in general, ambiguous.
Macroprudential policy reduces the frequency of crises and their impact on growth
but comes at the cost of reducing borrowing and growth in good times. To resolve
this ambiguity, I look at a calibrated version of the model.
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In the quantitative analysis, I find that optimal macroprudential policy substan-
tially reduces the frequency of crisis but has a very small negative effect on average
growth. As is known in the literature, changes in average growth have very large
welfare impacts (see Lucas (1987) and Barlevy (2004)). Given that optimal macro-
prudential policy has to lower average growth in order to increase financial stability, it
does not change growth by a large amount, because even a small reduction in growth
is costly in terms of welfare. Quantitatively, a 0.01 percentage point reduction in av-
erage growth leads to a welfare loss equivalent to a 0.34 percent permanent decrease
in annual consumption.
Nevertheless, macroprudential policy is still desirable because it reduces the proba-
bility of crisis and smooths consumption. The benefits from consumption smoothing
actually outweigh the welfare loss from the reduction in average growth. Overall,
welfare gains are at the magnitude of a 0.06 percent permanent increase in annual
consumption, which is in the same range as in the existing literature.
The model with endogenous growth also allows me to analyze the role of a stimulus
policy that is used both ex-ante and ex-post. When such a policy is available, much
larger welfare gains can be generated, since the cost of crises is reduced by the ex-
post intervention. Ex-ante, macroprudential policy is used to correct over-borrowing
in the credit market, and the stimulus policy is used to offset the negative impact of
macroprudential policy on growth. Optimal policy thus leads to a short-run boom in
growth and consumption, which significantly reduces the welfare loss from a reduction
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in average growth. In the long run, growth converges to a lower level, since resources
are used to serve a higher level of external borrowing. However, the short-run boom
in average growth lasts for 18 years.
This paper is suitable fodder for policymakers’ reflections about their policies’ im-
pacts on average growth and financial stability. One general message is that macro-
prudential policy only marginally lowers average growth to enhance financial stability.
Therefore, it is still desirable to use macroprudential policy, even taking into account
its negative impact on average growth. Furthermore, it is always desirable to have a
stimulus policy in addition to macroprudential policy, since these two policies com-
plement each other in mitigating the cost of financial crises.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the impact of macro-
prudential policy on growth. Hence, there are many unsolved, interesting questions
that I leave for future research. First, my paper is about the role of macropruden-
tial policy in capital flows. However, many countries, including advanced economies,
adopted macroprudential policies on other financial markets after the 2008-09 Global
Financial Crisis. It would be interesting to look at the effects of other macroprudential
policies (leverage ratio, capital requirement, etc). Second, my paper abstracts from
the risk-taking behavior in the economy. In the model, macroprudential policy nega-
tively affects growth because it restricts the amount of funding to productive projects.
However, private agents might respond to the policy by taking on riskier projects.
Such risk-taking behavior might be socially inefficient, even if it is privately optimal.
49
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL STABILITY, GROWTH AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
In the end, excessive risk-taking behavior might lower average growth. Therefore, it
may be interesting to see whether average growth is further driven down by optimal
policy.
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Figure 1.3: Policy Functions: CE and MP
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Figure 1.4: Ergodic Distributions: CE and MP
Figure 1.5: Event Window: CE and MP
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Figure 1.6: Transition Dynamics: CE and MP
Figure 1.7: Policy Impacts on Average Growth: CE and MP
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Figure 1.8: Welfare Gains (%): MP
Figure 1.9: Macroprudential Tax on Capital Flows
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Figure 1.10: Policy Functions: CE, MP and MI
55
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL STABILITY, GROWTH AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
Figure 1.11: Ergodic Distributions: CE, MP and MI
Figure 1.12: Event Window: CE, MP, and MI
56
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL STABILITY, GROWTH AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
Figure 1.13: Transition Dynamics: CE, MP, and MI
Figure 1.14: Policy Impacts on Average Growth: CE, MP, and MI
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Figure 1.15: Welfare Gains (%): MI
Figure 1.16: Two Instruments (%): MI
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Chapter 2
Welfare Gains from Market
Insurance: The Case of Mexican
Oil Price Risk (with Fabian
Valencia)
2.1 Introduction
The sharp decline in oil prices that started in late 2014 caught many oil-exporting
countries off guard, but not Mexico. Following a long-standing practice, in the fall of
2014, the Ministry of Finance had purchased put options with one year maturity to
hedge 228 million barrels of oil, about 28 percent of production, with a strike price
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of US$ 76.4 per barrel—US$ 31.1 above the actual average oil price in 2015.1
Sharp declines in oil prices have coincided with substantial fluctuations in eco-
nomic activity and inflation (Husain et al., 2015). For net oil exporters, the negative
consequences of the shock are also often amplified by rising risk spreads on sovereign
debt (Baffes et al., 2015). In this context, designing policies to manage risks emerging
from the exposure to commodity-price swings remains highly relevant, particularly
for commodity exporters. Drawing on Mexico’s experience, we assess the benefits and
costs of using market insurance to hedge commodity price risk and enhance macroe-
conomic resilience. To this end, we augment a standard sovereign default model with
access to put options —calibrated to Mexican data—to determine the size and main
channels of welfare gains relative to a counterfactual scenario without put options.
Our main contribution is the quantitative exploration of this question, exploiting
complementarities between hedging instruments and defaultable debt.
Our benchmark economy is exposed to price risk of its commodity exports and can
borrow through one-period defaultable debt acquired by risk-neutral foreign investors.
The default decision and pricing of debt follows a willingness-to-pay framework à la
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Since the country can default whenever it finds it op-
timal, bond prices fluctuate with the risk of default. The country can also purchase
put options from risk-neutral foreign investors to lock in a minimum price for its com-
modity exports in the subsequent period. In the absence of put options, consumption
1The options were in the money in 2009 and 2016 as well.
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smoothing takes place only through defaultable debt. The access to put options al-
lows for additional benefits as they can help smooth income fluctuations arising from
oil price volatility. But the upfront cost of put options also reduces consumption in
the current period. In a simplified two-period version of the benchmark economy, we
establish the aforementioned benefits—net of the cost of hedging—analytically.
After illustrating the main mechanisms in a simple model, we perform quantitative
simulations in our full-fledged benchmark economy and compare our results to a
version without put options. First, we find that using put options yields welfare
gains2 equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.44 percent. Second,
we decompose these gains between those operating through a reduction of borrowing
costs and those from income smoothing. The first channel emerges from the change
in default incentives induced by the reduction in downside risks to income through
put options. The second channel is similar to Lucas (1987), in which lower income
fluctuations translate into a smoother consumption path, which increases welfare for
risk averse agents. We conclude that about 90 percent of the welfare gains stem from
the borrowing costs channel. Compared to the economy without hedging, risk spreads
on debt are 19 basis points lower in the hedging economy.3
We also find that the welfare gains decline if the cost of the options includes a
premium above the actuarially fair price. However, only a sizable premium would
2We define welfare gains as the improvement in the present discounted value of the utility derived
from consumption.
3The welfare gains from income smoothing, at 0.04 percent, are very similar to what comes out
of applying Lucas (1987)’s methodology to Mexican consumption series during 1996-2016.
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reduce the welfare gains to zero. We also find that welfare gains increase with the
strike price of put options, the hedged volume of oil, the volatility of oil prices,
and with risk aversion of foreign investors. Finally, we find that selling oil forward
can generate larger welfare gains than buying put options because they imply not
incurring the upfront cost of insurance. However, political economy considerations
cannot be ignored since forwards also imply giving up any revenue windfall if oil prices
rise.4
Our paper contributes to the literature on welfare gains from market insurance
with contributions including Caballero and Panageas (2008), who focus on optimal
hedging strategies in countries facing risks of sudden stops in capital flows; and Boren-
sztein et al. (2013) who examine the welfare gains from hedging through options and
forwards in the presence of non-defaultable debt. Our paper differs from these studies
by exploring synergies between hedging instruments and defaultable debt in increas-
ing welfare. Furthermore, our paper is also related to studies examining the welfare
gains from contingent debt, such as Hatchondo and Martinez (2012), who focus on
GDP-indexed bonds, and Borensztein et al. (2017), who focus on catastrophic bonds.
One closely related paper is Lopez-Martin et al. (2017), calibrated also to Mexican
data. However, they model the government and the private sector separately and
focus on the income-smoothing aspect of macro hedging. We model the economy as
4A clear example of political cost is Ecuador, cited in Daniel (2001), whose government conducted
several hedging transactions through options and oil swaps in early 1993 that led to significant losses,
ultimately triggering heavy criticism and even the appointment of a special committee to investigate
allegations of corruption against the monetary authorities.
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a whole and focus on understanding the sources of welfare gains from macro hedging,
by looking at the relative importance of income smoothing and the relaxation of bor-
rowing constraints as drivers of those gains. Finally, our paper is also related to the
literature on quantitative models of sovereign default such as Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Arellano (2008), and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), although our focus is on
the welfare gains from relying on hedging instruments as a complement to defaultable
debt.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes Mexico’s oil hedging
program; Section 2.3 presents a two-period model to understand the benefits and
costs of hedging; Section 2.4 presents the benchmark model; Section 2.5 presents
quantitative results; Section 2.6 presents two extensions; and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Mexico’s Oil Hedging Program
Mexico’s government has systematically hedged oil-price risk for at least twenty
years through a hedging program that is known to be the largest in the world (Blass,
2017). The program, as it is known today, was set up in 2001, (Duclaud and Gar-
cia, 2012), although Mexico used market hedging instruments as early as 1990 (see
Potts and Lippman (1991) and Daniel (2001)); however, details about those earlier
operations are scarce. However, Mexico is not the only country that has used these
instruments. Ecuador, Ghana, and more recently Uruguay are other examples of
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countries which have relied on hedging instruments to guard against oil-price volatil-
ity.
According to the U.S. International Energy Administration, Mexico is the 12th
largest oil producer in the world. The oil sector is controlled by the fully state-owned
company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Therefore, oil-related risks directly affect
Mexico’s public finances. This is the reason why the Mexican treasury conducts the
hedging. On average, over 2000-2016, oil-related revenues represented 32 percent
of total fiscal revenues, of which, 47 percent corresponded to oil exports, and the
remainder to net domestic sales of petroleum products. Over the same period, oil
exports averaged 11 percent of total exports. While the importance of oil for the
economy and Mexico’s public finances has declined since the mid-2000’s,5 oil revenues
still represented about 16 percent of total fiscal revenues and close to 5 percent of total
exports in 2016. Moreover, there is a high negative correlation between risk spreads
on external sovereign debt and oil prices, with a correlation coefficient of −0.59 over
the past twenty years (Figure 2.1). A 2013 constitutional reform opened the oil sector
to private investment, but the private oil sector remained in its infancy as of end-2017.
However, it is expected to gain importance as private investment picks up and new
oil fields are exploited, which would eventually reverse the declining importance of
oil in the economy.6
5The decline has been the result of falling oil production due to aging oil fields, lower oil prices
since 2014, and higher non-oil tax revenues from a tax reform in place since 2014.
6A description of the reform that opened the energy sector to private investment and its potential
implications for future oil production can be found in IMF (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Oil Production, Oil Prices, and Sovereign Spreads





























The Mexican treasury conducts hedging operations with the main objective of
reducing the risk of fiscal revenue shortfalls during any given fiscal year. Specifically,
the Mexican treasury includes in its annual budget an assumption on the export price
of its oil for the subsequent fiscal year, computed as the weighted average between
historical prices and futures. To reduce the risk of a decline in oil-related revenues,
the Mexican treasury purchases Asian put options with strike price equal or close to
the oil price assumed in the budget. The use of Asian options allows the treasury
to lock in a minimum price for the whole fiscal year.7 The program is executed
through several contracts with foreign banks as counterparts. Most of the contracts
include Maya oil, a type of Mexican heavy crude oil, as underlying asset, but a small
7An American or European put option is exercised if the spot price on a particular day exceeds
the strike price. In contrast, an Asian put option is exercised if the average spot price for a pre-
determined period, which in the case of Mexico is one year, exceeds the strike price. In this way,
Mexico guarantees a minimum average price of oil for the whole fiscal year.
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fraction of contracts use the Brent as underlying asset. Maya oil dominates because
it represents about 80 percent of Mexico’s oil export volumes.
While on average, Mexico produced 1 billion barrels annually over 2000-2016, of
which it exported roughly half, Mexico also imported about 178 million barrels of
petroleum products annually, over the same period. The domestic sale of imported
petroleum products at regulated prices, which did not move one-for-one with interna-
tional prices, compensated losses (or gains) in crude oil export revenues that resulted
from fluctuations in international oil prices.8 After taking these offsetting factors into
account, the Mexican treasury hedged, on average, 29 percent of total production over
the past 10 years.
Since 2001, the cost of the options has averaged 0.1 percent of GDP per year
and they have been exercised only in three occasions: in 2009, 2015, and 2016, with
payoffs reaching 0.5, 0.6, and 0.3 percent of GDP respectively (Figure 2.2).
2.3 Benefits/Costs of Hedging in a Two-
period Model
Before proceeding to the quantitative analysis, we use a simple two-period model,
t ∈ {0, 1} to illustrate analytically the benefits and costs of hedging and its comple-
8A process of liberalization of domestic fuel prices began in 2016 and was completed by end-2017.
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Figure 2.2: Mexico’s Oil Hedging Program



























Source: INEGI and authors’ calculations.
mentarities with defaultable debt. Consumers choose in period 0 how much to issue
in bonds d at a price q as to maximize the present discounted value of utility derived
from consumption, with discount factor β < 1. Income is given by y in period 0
while it can take values yH or yL < yH in period 1, with probabilities p and 1 − p,
respectively. After income uncertainty is realized in period 1, consumers can default




log c0 + βE0 log c1
s.t. c0 = qd+ y
ci1 = max
{
yi − d, ydef
}
, i ∈ {H,L}
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where for simplicity we assume u(c) = log c. Assuming that the risk-free rate, r∗,
equals zero, risk-neutral foreign investors acquire the bonds at a price that satisfies
q =

1, if yL − d ≥ ydef ;
p, if yL − d < ydef ≤ yH − d;
0, if yH − d < ydef ,
where the first condition implies that risk spreads are zero because in those cir-
cumstances default is never optimal. The second condition states that consumers
always default under a bad realization of income in period 1, in which case q = p < 1.
Finally, the third condition implies that the bond is worthless since the consumers
would default with probability 1 as it is always optimal to do so. We now introduce
hedging in this framework. Suppose that the consumer buys insurance in period 0
that guarantees a level of income of at least ȳ in period 1 at a cost ξ that satisfies
ξ =

p(ȳ − yH) + (1− p)(ȳ − yL), if ȳ ≥ yH ;
(1− p)(ȳ − yL), if yL < ȳ < yH ;
0, if ȳ ≤ yL.
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Given the structure of put options, the problem for the economy becomes
Uhedge0 = max
d
log c0 + βE0 log c1
s.t. c0 = qd+ y − ξ
ci1 = max
{
max{ȳ, yi} − d, ydef
}
, i ∈ {H,L}
Role of Hedging. Let us first assume that the insured level of income, ȳ, equals
the unconditional mean of period-1 income, that is ȳ = pyH + (1 − p)yL. Hedging
plays first an income-smoothing role by reducing income fluctuations in period 1 since
yL < ȳ < yH and with hedging, period-1 income is either ȳ or yH . Second, hedging
can alter default and borrowing incentives, but not necessarily in an unambiguous
way. In the following propositions we demonstrate the various implications of hedging
for default incentives and welfare.
Proposition 3. Default Incentives and Hedging
Consider an economy with no hedging in which ŷdef and ˆ̂ydef are such that consumers
never default if the income loss from default is too large, i.e. ydef < ŷdef ; they always
default if the income loss from default is too small, i.e. ydef > ˆ̂ydef ; and they only
default after a low realization of income if the income loss from default is neither too
large nor too small, ydef ∈ (ŷdef , ˆ̂ydef ). Introducing hedging in this economy increases
ŷdef and reduces ˆ̂ydef .
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1.
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Intuitively, Proposition 3 states that hedging can change default thresholds, by
either improving or worsening incentives to default. The direction in which those
incentives change depends on how costly it is to default. When default is so costly
so that it never happens (i.e. the farthest left region in Figure 2.3, ydef < ŷdef ),
hedging does not affect default incentives. Reduce default costs a bit and we enter
the middle region, i.e. ydef ∈ (ŷdef , ˆ̂ydef ), where changes in the default thresholds
can lead to the economy to never default or to always default. In the former case,
the result follows from the fact that hedging helps secure a minimum income—above
the default level—and therefore reduces incentives to default and the cost of debt.
In the latter case, the income under default is higher, and therefore default is less
costly. Because hedging requires increasing borrowing to pay for the upfront cost of
insurance, it may worsen default incentives given that it is not so costly to default.
The farthest right region is in the proposition for completeness only. In this region,
the cost of default is so small that the economy would always default. Therefore,
it is not an interesting case to analyze since no creditor would lend to consumers
who would default with probability 1. In the following propositions, we analyze the
implications for welfare under all these cases except for the last one.
Proposition 4. No Default in Equilibrium
When default is too costly, such that the economy does not default in equilibrium,
introducing hedging increases social welfare and the country borrows more.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.2.
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In this case, hedging is clearly beneficial. Income becomes smoother and the econ-
omy can afford to borrow more. This insight is similar to the work by Borensztein et
al. (2013) who derived welfare implications of hedging in a world with non-defaultable
debt.
Proposition 5. Default Only When Income is Low
When the economy defaults only when y = yL, whether hedging increases or decreases
welfare depends on its impact on default incentives:
1. if hedging reduces default incentives, hedging increases welfare, but borrowing
might increase or decrease.
2. if hedging does not change default incentives, it reduces welfare and increases
borrowing.
3. if hedging increases default incentives, both social welfare and borrowing decline.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.3.
In case 1, both the income-smoothing and borrowing cost channels imply a wel-
fare gain despite the upfront cost of insurance. However, the impact of hedging on
borrowing is ambiguous: On the one hand, more borrowing is desirable to purchase
insurance; on the other hand, more borrowing increases the likelihood of default and
hence the cost of debt, ultimately reducing incentives to borrow.
In case 2, hedging ensures higher income in the low state of the world than in
absence of hedging, only if there is no default; however, if the economy defaults
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when y = yL, hedging does not change default incentives, nor the level of income
since default implies the same level of income under default, ydef , as the no-hedging
economy. In this case, consumers borrow more in period 0 to purchase insurance, but
income in period 1 is the same with or without hedging. As a result, hedging only
lowers current disposable income and reduces welfare.
In case 3, if hedging increases default incentives it clearly reduces welfare since it
would imply that the economy moves from the region where it only defaults in the
bad state of nature to the region where it always defaults.
Figure 2.3 summarizes key insights from the above propositions. The left regions
in the figure correspond to areas where the cost of default is high. In these regions,
hedging is always desirable either because both, the borrowing costs channel and
the income smoothing channel are at work, which is the case when hedging reduces
default risk, or because only the income smoothing channel is at work, which is the
case when there is no default in equilibrium. The model also includes regions where
hedging reduces welfare because the costs of default are small. However, the fact that
defaults are rare events —Mexico has defaulted only 8 times since 1821 —and the
empirical literature documents significant output losses following sovereign defaults,
the left regions in Figure 2.3 are likely to be the more empirically relevant cases. We
resort now to our quantitative analysis to shed light on the size of welfare gains from
hedging.
72
CHAPTER 2. WELFARE GAINS FROM MARKET INSURANCE: THE CASE
































































































































































CHAPTER 2. WELFARE GAINS FROM MARKET INSURANCE: THE CASE
OF MEXICAN OIL PRICE RISK (WITH FABIAN VALENCIA)
2.4 Model Economy
The question of welfare gains from hedging commodity price risk has been explored
in models with non-defaultable debt (Borensztein et al., 2013, 2017). Since default
risk is in practice not zero, our departure point is a standard sovereign default model
as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). In this economy, a country
can issue one-period bonds in international credit markets on which the country can
default when it finds it beneficial to do so. But default is costly. A default implies
losing access to international credit markets, although not permanently, and lower
income. There is only one source of risk in this economy: oil prices. In addition to
issuing defaultable debt, the country can acquire put options to hedge oil price risk
in international financial markets. The quantitative assessment of the welfare gains
from using put options will be conducted by comparing outcomes with and without
put options.
2.4.1 Benchmark Model with Defaultable Debt and
Put Options
The economy is populated by infinitely-living, risk-averse representative agents
who make decisions in order to maximize the expected present discounted value—
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where risks preferences of the consumer are represented by a standard constant rela-
tive risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with coefficient of risk aversion γ.
Total income in this economy, Yt, has two components: non-oil income (Ft) and
oil income (Xt),
Yt = Ft +Xt ≡ Ft + ptQt (2.2)
where pt and Qt are the price and quantity of oil production respectively. The only
source of risk in this economy is the price of oil, pt, which is assumed to follow an
autoregressive stochastic process, to be defined momentarily. We assume that non-
oil income, Ft, grows deterministically at a constant rate G in every period. We




= 1 + pt
Qt
Ft















denote normalized oil production and consumption. To
further simplify the exposition, we assume that Q is constant, which as we will discuss
in the calibration section, it is not an inaccurate representation of the data. From
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now on we will focus on the normalized problem knowing that the original problem
can always be recovered by multiplying normalized variables by Ft (See Appendix
B.1 for details).
In every period, consumers have an initial level of wealth, wt, composed by income,
yt, and bonds, bt, acquired in the previous period: wt = yt + bt. Consumers allocate
this wealth among consumption, ct; zero-coupon one-period bonds, bt+1, which they
can acquire in international credit markets at a price qt; and put options acquired
in international financial markets at a unit price ξ(p̄t), which entitles them to sell a
fraction αQ of oil production in period t+ 1 at a pre-determined strike price p̄t.9
ct + qtGbt+1 + αQGξ(p̄t) = wt (2.5)
where bt+1 can take positive or negative values reflecting whether the country lends
or borrows in international credit markets. The consumer arrives to the following
period, t+ 1, with wealth wt+1, given by
wt+1 = yt+1 + αQmax{p̄t − pt+1, 0}+ bt+1 (2.6)
where αQmax{p̄t−pt+1, 0} reflects the fact that the put options locked in a minimum
price, p̄t, for the hedged fraction of oil production. The optimization problem, under
9α ∈ (0, 1) captures the fact that Mexico hedges only part of production, as discussed in the
previous section
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no default, is summarized by




+ βG1−γEt [V (wt+1, pt+1)] (2.7)
s.t. ct + qtGbt+1 + αQGξ(p̄t) = wt
wt+1 = yt+1 + αQmax{p̄t − pt+1, 0}+ bt+1
where V c(wt, pt) denotes the value function under continuation or no default, with
the state of the economy summarized by two state variables, {wt, pt}.
Default Decision. In every period, consumers can default on their debt, in
which case the economy gets excluded from international financial markets. While
in default, consumers cannot borrow nor purchase put options and the economy re-
sorts to financial autarky. Besides the exclusion from international financial markets,
default implies an income loss h (yt) in every period, reflecting the assumption that
credit plays an essential role in the economy. This assumption can be justified by
the existence of a minimum scale for some investment projects that would not be
reached without external financing, preventing those investments from being carried
out. Alternatively, the exclusion from international financial markets may obstruct
the normal conduct of business of companies operating with non-residents by re-
ducing or eliminating the access to financial services that may be essential to their
activity, such as trade finance. The assumption ultimately aims at capturing output
losses often linked to sovereign default episodes (e.g. Laeven and Valencia, 2013 and
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Gornemann, 2014). A default status does not imply permanent exclusion from finan-
cial markets. It is assumed that in any given period, there is a probability λ ∈ (0, 1)
that the economy is “redeemed” and re-enters international credit markets with zero
net assets.
Denoting the value function under default as V dt (pt), the problem for an economy






λEtV (wt+1, pt+1) + (1− λ)EtV d(pt+1)
]
(2.8)
s.t. ct = yt − h (yt)
wt+1 = yt+1
where V (wt, pt) = max
(
V c(wt, pt), V
d(pt)
)
reflects that default happens if and only
if V d(pt) > V
c(wt, pt).
Risk-Neutral Foreign Investors. We assume that there is a continuum of risk-
neutral foreign investors who can purchase bonds or sell put options to consumers in
the benchmark economy. If default happens, foreign investors do not recover any value
from the bonds and renege to honor the put options. However, for simplicity, any value
foreign investors recover by reneging to honor the options is assumed to be consumed
in transaction costs or legal fees. Consequently, recovery values are assumed at zero
in the pricing of the bonds. Note that this assumption may ultimately understate the
welfare gains from hedging as these recoveries, if not zero, could lead to lower risk
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spreads on debt.
Denoting r∗ the world risk-free rate and D(wt+1, pt+1) an indicator default func-











Et[max{p̄t − pt+1, 0}]
1 + r∗
The above equations imply that the expected return to the foreign investor from
holding bonds or being the counterpart of a put option are equalized and given by
the risk-free return. Hedging income appears in the default function, affecting the
price of bonds and the risk spreads.
2.4.2 An Economy without Put Options
The benchmark economy includes the availability of put options because the model
will be calibrated to Mexican data over a period where Mexico hedged oil price risk
through these instruments. To quantify gains from hedging, we setup a counterfactual
economy with no access to put options. To differentiate these two economies, we use
a tilde over variables that correspond to the no-hedging economy. State variables
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{wt, pt} are defined in the same way as before and value functions are given by
Ṽ (wt, pt) = max
(
Ṽ c(wt, pt), Ṽ
d(pt)
)
where Ṽ c(wt, pt) and Ṽ
d(pt) denote the value functions of continuation and default
respectively.
As before, the problem under no default or continuation is given by









s.t. ct + q̃tGbt+1 = wt,
wt+1 = yt+1 + bt+1,
where q̃t is the price of the bond in the no-hedging economy. Note also the absence
of the terms related to the purchase and exercise of options in the budget constraint






λEtṼ (wt+1, pt+1) + (1− λ)EtṼ d(pt+1)
]
.(2.11)
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2.4.3 Recursive Equilibrium
As it is standard in the sovereign default literature, we solve the problem from the
perspective of a benevolent government, who makes the decision on behalf of private
agents in the economy. In what follows we define the recursive equilibrium in this
economy.
Definition 2. Markov Perfect Equilibrium
1. The Markov Perfect Equilibrium of our benchmark model is characterized by a
set of value functions {V (wt, pt), V c(wt, pt), V d(wt, pt)}, default function D(wt, pt),
consumption function ct, next period bond holding bt+1, and bond price qt such
that given the state variables {wt, pt}, the cost of put options ξ(p̄t), and the
strike price p̄t, they solve the optimization problems (2.7) and (2.8). Further-
more, V (wt, pt) = max
(
V c(wt, pt), V
d(pt)
)
and the price qt satisfies equation
(2.9).
2. The Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the economy without put options is char-
acterized by a set of value functions {Ṽ (wt, pt), Ṽ c(wt, pt), Ṽ d(wt, pt)}, default
function D̃(wt, pt), consumption function c̃t, next period bond holding b̃t+1, and
bond price q̃t such that given the state variables {wt, pt}, they solve the optimiza-
tion problems (2.10) and (2.11). Furthermore, Ṽ (wt, pt) = max
(
Ṽ c(wt, pt), Ṽ
d(pt)
)
and the price q̃t satisfies equation (2.12).
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2.5 Quantitative Analysis
2.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the benchmark model to Mexican data over 1996-2016, a period
during which Mexico used put options to hedge oil price risk. The benchmark model
has 13 parameters, which we split in three groups before assigning values.
The first group of parameters, comprising {r∗, γ, λ, p, ρ, σ,Q, α,G}, are directly
taken from the literature or data. The real risk-free interest rate, r∗, equals the
average over 1996-2016 of the nominal yield on 1-year U.S. treasury bills, converted
to real terms using the U.S. GDP deflator, resulting in a value of 0.64 percent. The
risk aversion parameter, γ, is set at 2, the standard value found in the literature. The
probability of returning to international financial markets after having defaulted,
λ, is calibrated to match the duration of default episodes for Mexico. To get this
number, we examine a much longer time period, covering 1821-2016, over which
Mexico defaulted 8 times. On average, the duration of default episodes is 9.38 years,
which suggests a value of λ equals to 0.11.10 The parameters of the oil-price process,
p, ρ, σ, are obtained from estimating a log AR(1) process of the following form







+ ρ log pt−1 + εt (2.13)
10The default data are taken from Carmen Reinhart’s website. See http://www.carmenreinhart.
com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/7/.
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where the unconditional mean p, the persistence parameter ρ, and volatility σ are
estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) described in Appendix B.4
over the period 1996-2016. To complete the calibration of the income process, we use
actual quantities of Mexican oil production, which over 1996-2016 averaged 1.03 bil-
lion barrels per year. Non-oil income, Ft, is approximated by non-oil GDP—measured
as total Mexican GDP after subtracting oil and gas extraction. Since the model is
written in terms of one tradable good, we convert Ft to U.S. dollars using market
exchange rates, and then to real terms using the U.S. GDP deflator. The determinis-
tic annual real growth rate, G, of non-oil income is computed as the average growth
of non-oil income over 1996-2016, resulting in a value of 3.13 percent. We calculate
the normalized value of oil production, Q, by dividing oil GDP by non-oil income
and the oil price. In the model, we are assuming that this ratio is constant, equal to
0.1 percent, which is not a significant departure from the data. This ratio was fairly
stable over 1996-2016, ranging between 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent. The fraction
of oil production hedged, α, is set at 29 percent, which corresponds to the average
fraction of production hedged by Mexico over 2006-2016. We consider this range only
because of lack of publicly available data on the actual fraction hedged prior to 2006.
The second group of parameters, comprising {β, y∗}, is chosen to match relevant
moments in the data. In selecting the output loss from default, we follow Arellano
(2008) who adopts an asymmetric output cost function which delivers default rates
and spreads within the range seen in the data. To this end, the output loss function
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yt − y∗, if yt ≥ y∗,
0, if yt < y
∗.
We choose β and y∗ to match two empirical moments: (1) the Mexican govern-
ment’s gross financing needs—defined as the overall fiscal deficit in any given year plus
debt rollover needs—to non-oil fiscal revenue ratio over 2006-2016, of 11.90 percent,
a definition of debt that most closely matches the definition of debt in the model; (2)
the average risk spreads on sovereign debt over 2000-2016, 1.48 percent. Risk spreads
are calculated as the difference between the yield in dollars on Mexico’s 1-year gov-
ernment bonds and the yield on U.S. 1-year treasury bills. We compute the average
over 2000-2016 to avoid distortions from the sharp increase in spreads around the
Tequila crisis of 1995.
The last group of parameters includes the cost and strike price of the options,
{ξ(p̄t), p̄t}. As discussed in Section 2.4 the price is determined by a risk-neutral
pricing condition and therefore it emerges endogenously once other parameters in the
model have been determined. The exact implementation of the pricing function is
given in Appendix B.5. The strike price is chosen to match the conditional mean
of the oil price. While we have data for the actual strike price chosen by Mexico,
the sample is too short to estimate a robust empirical relationship between the strike
price and the actual oil price. Instead, we proceed as follows. First, we assume that
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p̄t = µEt[pt+1|pt], with the goal of capturing Mexico’s actual choice for the strike price,
which intends to be close to the oil price assumed in the budget for the subsequent
year. This budget oil price is in turn determined by a weighted average between
past and future prices implied by forward contracts, which aims at capturing the
long-run price of oil, given current market conditions. Second, we choose a value
of µ such that the simulated long-run probability of exercising the options is 18.75
percent, consistent with the fact that between 2001 and 2016, the Mexican government
exercised the options only 3 times. The approach yields a value of µ equal to 0.77.
To cross check that this approach does not result in a number significantly different
than the one implied by the data, we compute µ directly from the data by dividing
the actual strike price by the average oil price in the year when the options where
purchased (Table 2.1). This alternative approach returns an average value for µ of
0.85, close to the value of 0.77 used in the baseline calibration.
Table 2.1: Actual Strike Prices from Options















0.77 0.87 0.79 1.03 0.90 0.92 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.74 0.85
Source: Auditoria Superior Federal and authors’ calculations.
Finally, it is important to note that a period in this model corresponds to one
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year, and all values are expressed in 2009 constant U.S. dollar terms. All parameter
values are reported in Table 2.2. The bottom part of the table shows that the model-
simulated moments are very close to their data counterparts. It is worth noting also
that while our discount factor, at 0.76, appears low for an annual frequency, values
in this range are found in the literature, for example Yue (2010) chooses a discount
rate at 0.72. It is well-known that sovereign default models with one-period bonds
have difficulty in matching both default spreads and debt ratios simultaneously. To
achieve both goals, we have to pick a lower value for the discount factor.
Table 2.2: Parameters
Parameters Value Source
Risk-free rate r∗ = 0.64% U.S. real interest rate
Risk aversion γ = 2 Standard value
Probability of redemption λ = 0.11 Average years in default
Growth rate G = 1.0313 Data
Unconditional mean p = 54.60 Data
Persistence ρ = 0.71 Data
Volatility σ = 0.25 Data
Oil to non-oil GDP ratio pQ = 6% Data
Strike price p̄t = µEt[pt+1|pt] = 0.77Et[pt+1|pt] Prob of exercising options
Hedging share α = 0.29 Data
Hedging cost ξ(p̄t) Risk-neutral pricing
Discount rate β = 0.76 Match debt ratio
Output loss function y∗ = 0.98E[y] = 1.03 Match spreads
Target Moments Data Model Simulation
Debt-GDP ratio 11.90 % 11.97 %
Sovereign spreads 1.48% 1.40 %
Source: INEGI, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and authors’ calculations.
We solve the model numerically using value function iteration with the algorithm
described in more detail in Appendix B.3. We use Rouwenhorst method as in Kopecky
and Suen (2010) to determine the grid for oil prices. Specifically, we use 21 and 500
grids to approximate oil price and bond holdings respectively.
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2.5.2 Welfare Gains from Hedging
We measure welfare gains from hedging by comparing the utility derived from
the stream of consumption under the benchmark economy, and the one in the no-
hedging economy. We follow the standard convention in the literature of expressing
the welfare gains in terms of a permanent increase in annual consumption. Formally,
the definition is given in equation (2.14).









Under this definition, welfare gains are conditional on the values of the state
variables, {wt, pt}; therefore, we refer to ∆(wt, pt) as conditional welfare gains.11
Furthermore, we also define unconditional welfare gains by E[∆(wt, pt)], where the
expectation is taken with respect to the state variables using their ergodic distribution
under the benchmark economy.12 To compute the welfare gains, we first run 100
Monte Carlo simulations of 2,000 periods each for the benchmark economy. We draw
oil prices from the estimated stochastic process, given some initial price. This initial
condition, together with one for wealth, and the optimal solutions for consumption
and borrowing determine the optimal value of these variables for the current period.
We then check if default is optimal or not, to then proceed to use the law of motion for
11Note that ∆(wt, pt) does not depend on any particular time t. We keep the time script t for
consistency of notation.
12Using instead the ergodic distribution under the economy without hedging yields similar out-
comes.
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wealth and oil prices to determine the value of the state variables for the subsequent
period and so on. We repeat this process until we reach 2,000 periods. We throw
away the initial 500 periods and approximate welfare—or the value function—by
computing the present discounted value of the utility derived from the simulated
path for consumption. We construct the counterpart value function for the economy
without hedging, using the same procedure and initial conditions for wt and pt.
In Figure 2.4 we show the conditional welfare gains ∆(wt, pt); bond purchase/sale
bt+1; the probability of default in the current period t; and the probability of default in
the next period t+ 1, given by E[D(yt+1 + bt+1, pt+1)|pt]; for different values of state
variable wt, and after setting the price of oil, pt, equal to its unconditional mean.
These conditional welfare gains vary from 0 to a 0.45 percent permanent increase
in consumption. When the economy has less wealth to start, default incentives are
strong, the probability of default in current period t is high, and welfare gains from
hedging are small. In this region, hedging does little to improve welfare since default
happens regardless, analogous to the result in the farthest right region of Figure 2.3.
When the economy is less indebted, default incentives weaken and the probability
of default declines, but more quickly for the economy with hedging than for the one
without it. For values of wealth wt between 0.91 and 0.92, the economy without
hedging defaults in the current period, but the economy with hedging does not. This
region is analogous to region B in Figure 2.3. In this region, welfare jumps from close
to 0 to 0.43 percent. As wealth increases, welfare gains decline as default becomes
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less and less relevant. At some point, even the no-hedging economy does not default
in the current period and it has the same default probability in the next period as
the hedging economy. Welfare declines further since hedging is costly and its benefit
through a reduction in borrowing costs is much lower. This result is analogous to the
result depicted in the left regions of Figure 2.3.
We also find unconditional welfare gains equivalent to a permanent increase in
annual consumption of 0.44 percent. These gains are within the range found by related
studies. Borensztein et al. (2017) finds that the unconditional welfare gains from using
catastrophe (CAT) bonds, in the presence of defaultable debt, are typically small: less
than 0.12 percent. They rationalize their results by claiming that the CAT bonds do
not change the default threshold. Hatchondo and Martinez (2012) explore the welfare
gains from issuing GDP-indexed bonds in a model with defaultable debt. They find
that GDP-indexed bonds could change the default threshold and find welfare gains
equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.46 percent.
Source of Welfare Gains. As discussed in the context of the 2-period model, we
explore two channels, one operating through income smoothing and the second one
through default incentives, which ultimately affect borrowing costs. The latter chan-
nel can already be appreciated in Table 2.3, where we compare the stochastic steady
state—defined as the average value of the corresponding variables in the long-run
simulations—of the benchmark model with the one from the model without hedging.
We find that the probability of default is higher in the model without hedging, 1.41
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Figure 2.4: Welfare Gains, Borrowing, and Probability of Default
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Conditional welfare gains, ∆(wt, pt); borrowing, bt+1; the probability of default
in the current period; and the probability of default in the next period are plotted
against values of wealth, wt with pt set equal to its unconditional mean.
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percent versus 1.27 percent, default spreads are also higher, 1.59 percent versus 1.4
percent, and the debt level is lower, 10.50 percent versus 11.97 percent. Recall that
proposition 5 implied that the impact of hedging on the debt level was ambiguous;
however, our quantitative results suggest that debt increases with hedging. It in-
creases due to a lower borrowing cost and also a stronger incentive to borrow because
of the additional borrowing needed to purchase the put options.
Table 2.3: Stochastic Steady State in the Hedging and No-hedging Economies
Economy debt ratio default spreads default probability
Hedging 11.97 % 1.40 % 1.27 %
No-Hedging 10.50 % 1.59 % 1.41 %
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: We run 100 Monte Carlo simulations of 2,000 periods each for the economies
with and without hedging. The initial 500 periods are dropped for each simulation.
The reported debt ratio and spreads are calculated as the average values, across
periods and simulations, conditional on no default for each economy. The probability
of default is calculated as the average fraction, across periods and simulations, of
default periods.
Figure 2.5 shows bond prices and risk spreads and highlights that the model with
hedging has systematically higher bond prices, except in the region where default risk
is zero in which case bond prices equal 1 for both the benchmark and the no-hedging
model. To decompose more explicitly the borrowing cost and income-smoothing
channels of welfare gains, we solve the model without hedging after imposing the
same bond price that emerges in the economy with hedging. Note that now we have
two versions of the no-hedging economy. One that is solved as if bond prices were the
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same as if hedging was present, and the standard one where bond prices correspond
to the no-hedging world. Since the only difference between these two models is the
borrowing cost, the resulting welfare gains stem entirely from the borrowing costs
channel.13 Our simulation suggests that the unconditional welfare gains from the
no-hedging economy with hedging bond prices relative to the no-hedging economy
with no-hedging bond prices are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption
of 0.40 percent, that is, a 90 percent of the total welfare gains.
Figure 2.5: Bond Price and Sovereign Spreads
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Bond prices, qt, and spreads are plotted as a function of wt, with pt set equal to
its unconditional mean. Spreads are computed as the difference between bond yields







13The remaining channel should include gains from income smoothing, net of the cost of hedging,
because the above exercise does not take into account the cost of hedging.
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To gain further intuition, we examine the dynamic behavior of key variables
around default episodes in Figure 2.6. To this end, we construct a 11,000-period
simulation for the hedging and no-hedging economies. After dropping the first 1,000
periods, we identify all default episodes by the no-hedging economy in the remaining
10,000 periods. We look at a 20-period window, centered on the default year, that is,
10 years before and after default, and examine the evolution of key variables within
this window. In Figure 2.6, we plot the average path of the corresponding variable
for the hedging and no-hedging economy, keeping in mind that the hedging economy
may not have defaulted.
A sharp decline in oil prices, pt, at time 0, triggers a payoff from the options
which compensates the income fall in the hedging economy. The no-hedging economy
defaults, which reduces the stock of debt to zero, but the probability of default rises
sharply even in the hedging economy, peaking at 89 percent. The high persistence in
the oil price process keeps income prospects weak for some time in both economies,
with borrowing being restored gradually, more so in the no-hedging economy than
in the hedging economy. This result is the consequence of the temporary exclusion
from financial markets and the higher borrowing costs for the no-hedging economy.
Finally, the hedging economy is able to sustain higher levels of consumption than in
the no-hedging economy, despite the cost of the options, because of lower cost of debt.
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2.5.3 Robustness Check
Cost of Put Options. Our baseline calculation assumes an actuarially fair price for
put options. In practice, the actual price can include a premium above the actuar-
ially fair price. This premium may stem from non-competitive behavior, regulatory
constraints, risk aversion, and market illiquidity. In the case of Mexico, the use of
over-the-counter options with Maya oil as underlying asset could lead to a cost pre-
mium given that such instruments are not as liquid as options on the Brent or the
West Texas Intermediate (WTI).14 To examine the implications of such a cost pre-
mium, we now assume that there is an additional cost x per barrel of oil, above the
actuarially fair price. In Figure 2.7, we plot the welfare gains from hedging against
various levels of the cost premium x, expressed as a ratio to the actuarially fair price.
Not surprisingly, the welfare gains decline with x; however, reducing the welfare gains
to zero in this model would require a sizable premium, in the order of 2.3 times the
actuarially fair price.15 The reason for the decline in welfare gains is that the op-
tions become relatively more expensive than debt, assuming that debt remains fairly
priced. Naturally, if a cost premium also affects the price of debt, then the impact on
welfare gains would depend on the relative size of the distortions in debt and option
prices.
14Mexico’s decision to use Maya oil as underlying asset is justified on the grounds of avoiding base
risk, defined as unexpected movements in Maya oil price not explained by movements in the price
of Brent or WTI oil.
15The cost premium at which welfare gains are zero, expressed in 2009 constant dollars, is equiva-
lent to US$2.1 per barrel. During 2006-2016, Mexico paid on average US$ 3.5 per barrel to purchase
the put options, which is an alternative way to corroborate that the cost premium has to be sizable
to reduce welfare gains to zero.
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Strike Prices. In our benchmark analysis, the strike price is a fraction µ of the
expected oil price for next year conditional on the current period’s price. We noted
in the calibration section that we could compute µ directly in the data, although for
only a handful of years for which there was publicly available information. The data
suggested a range for µ between 0.72 and 1.14, as shown in Table 2.1. We arbitrarily
chose values for µ of 0.74 and 1.03 and solve the model again to compute the welfare
gains. We found that welfare gains increase with the strike price. Moreover, as wel-
fare gains increase, the cost premium computed above also becomes larger, suggesting
that the gains becomes less sensitive to the presence of a cost premium in the price
of the options. These results, and those described in the remaining of this section,
are reported in Table 2.4.
Oil Price Process. Three parameters govern the oil price process, i.e. persistence
ρ, volatility σ and the unconditional mean p. Increasing the unconditional mean for
the oil price is inconsequential for our results if volatility and persistence remain the
same. This result is intuitive since the exercise leaves risk intact. Increasing the per-
sistence of oil prices reduces welfare gains because, given the one-year horizon of the
options, hedging would compensate for a smaller fraction of the cumulative income
loss relative to a scenario where oil prices recover more quickly. In turn, the welfare
gains increase with the volatility of oil prices, which is associated with higher risk of
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default, because the borrowing costs channel strengthens. Note that when welfare
gains become larger, the cost premium at which gains vanish becomes larger, sug-
gesting as before that the gains become more robust to the presence of a cost premium.
Other Parameters. We also conduct robustness checks with respect to other param-
eters in our model, with the results also summarized in Table 2.4. Generally speaking,
the benefits from hedging are robust to different parameter values. In particular, the
welfare gains are larger when a larger volume of oil production, α, is hedged because
a larger fraction of income is protected. Moreover, risk spreads decline as the risk
of default is lower. Gains are also larger when consumers are more risk averse, i.e.
higher γ, since they dislike income fluctuations more. Welfare gains also increase with
G since higher growth in non-oil income increases the desire to borrow, whose cost
is reduced by hedging. Welfare gains decline when the international risk-free rate,
r∗, increases, which in turns makes borrowing more expensive, reducing the desire
to borrow. With lower borrowing, the benefits of hedging through the borrowing
cost channel weaken. Welfare gains also decline when the income loss from default
is lower. This is represented in the Table by increasing y∗. The result is analogous
to what happens in the right regions of Figure 2.3 depicting the outcomes from our
two-period model. Note n Table 2.4 that for sufficiently low cost of default, i.e. suffi-
ciently high y∗, the welfare gains vanish since hedging in those cases increase default
incentives (Proposition 5). Welfare gains decrease with the probability of redemption
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λ. Since losing access to international financial markets is one component of the cost
of default, increasing λ is equivalent to reducing the cost of default; therefore, the
result is consistent with what happens when y∗ is higher. Intuitively, when default is
less costly, the benefits of hedging decline in the presence of defaultable debt, which
serves also as a hedging and consumption smoothing instrument. Welfare gains de-
cline with the discount factor, β, since the more patient consumers become, the less
they borrow, and the weaker the borrowing costs channel of welfare gains.
2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Selling Oil Forward
In our baseline model, the upfront cost of options generates a tradeoff. On the one
hand, hedging helps smooth income, but on the other it implies devoting resources
in the current period to the cost of hedging. We contrast the welfare gains with an
alternative hedging vehicle: selling oil forward at a predetermined price. There is no
upfront cost of insurance, as it is the case for the options, but the country also gives
up any revenue windfall if oil prices rise unexpectedly. We maintain the one-year
horizon of the hedge. We model this variant of hedging by assuming that the country
sells a fraction α of oil production at the conditional mean of the oil price in each
period. The new budget constraint and dynamics of beginning-period-of wealth are
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given by
wt = ct + qtGbt+1
wt+1 = 1 +Q{(1− α)pt+1 + αEt[pt+1]}+ bt+1
To understand the benefits/costs of forward, we first modify our two-period model
to include forwards and derive the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Forwards and default incentives
Define ydef as the income under default in the no-hedging economy such that the
economy does not default when ydef < ŷdef , i.e when the cost of default is sufficiently
high. Introducing forwards at a price equal to the conditional mean increases ŷdef .
Proof. Proof is given in Appendix B.2.4.
One implication from Proposition 6 is that the introduction of forwards can reduce
default incentives. A similar plot to Figure 2.3 is presented in Figure B.116 in the
appendix. Similar to options, if default never happens, hedging through forwards
increases welfare only through the income smoothing channel (Region A in Figure
B.1), when the no-hedging economy defaults in the low-income state of the world,
introducing forwards reduce the likelihood of default to zero since income is locked
in at a level above the income level under default. In in this case, forwards increase
16The figure shows the case where ŷdef,forward < ˆ̂ydef . However, it is theoretically possible that
ŷdef,forward > ˆ̂ydef .
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welfare through income smoothing and lower borrowing costs (Region B in Figure
B.1). For completeness, we also describe the implications of the model when default
costs are sufficiently low, meaning that yH > ˆ̂ydef > ŷdef,forward > ŷdef > yL. In
this case, forwards worsen default incentives. However, it is not an interesting case
to examine since it would imply locking in through forwards a level of income below
what the economy would get if it defaulted.
Turning now to the quantitative analysis, we find welfare gains from hedging
through forwards equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.89 percent,
roughly twice as large as those from our baseline model. However, recall that in our
baseline calibration, the strike price for the put options is set at p̄t = µEt[pt+1|pt],
with µ = 0.77, while in this section, the economy hedges through selling oil forward
at a price equal to Et[pt+1|pt]. Therefore, to conduct a more appropriate comparison
between forwards and options, we compute the welfare gains from hedging through
put options after setting µ = 1. As shown in Table 2.5, the resulting welfare gains
from options are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.75, higher
than in the baseline calibration, but still below those from forwards. With forwards,
the probability of default and risk spreads are lower than in the model with options,
while the economy can afford to borrow more (Table 2.5).
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Table 2.5: Welfare Gains from Selling Oil Forward
Welfare Gains (%) Debt (%) Default Spreads (%) Default Prob. (%)
Overall Hedging No Hedging Hedging No Hedging Hedging No Hedging
Forwards (µ = 1) 0.89 14.19 10.50 0.96 1.59 0.92 1.41
Put Options (µ = 1) 0.75 13.32 10.50 1.14 1.59 1.06 1.41
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: We run 100 Monte Carlo simulations of 2,000 periods each for the economies
with and without hedging. The initial 500 periods are dropped for each simulation.
The reported debt ratio and spreads are calculated as the average values, across
periods and simulations, excluding default episodes for each economy. The probability
of default is calculated as the average fraction, across periods and simulations, of
default periods. Welfare gains are calculated by constructing simulations for both
economies subject to the same stochastic shocks and initial conditions, and then
computing the present discounted value of the utility of consumption to ultimately
express the difference in terms of consumption equivalents.
2.6.2 Risk Averse Investors
This last extension is intended to understand the benefits of hedging in a world in
which global changes in risk appetite affect commodity and other asset prices simul-
taneously. For simplicity, we model this situation as having risk averse international
investors who have a time-variant pricing kernel mt, i.e. the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution. We follow Arellano (2008) in assuming that mt is an i.i.d. ran-
dom variable. The pricing of sovereign bond and options are given by the following
formula.
qt(bt+1, pt) = Et[mt+1(1−D(yt+1 + bt+1, pt+1))] (2.15)
ξt(pt) = Et[mt+1 max(p̄− pt+1, 0)] (2.16)
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with mt+1 = e
−r∗e−νεt+1 to ensure mt+1 is non-negative. After taking logs mt can
be written as
logmt = −r∗ − νεt
with E[logmt] = −r∗ and var(logmt) = ν2σ2. Note that εt is the same shock to oil
prices, which implies that foreign investors become effectively more or less risk averse
when oil prices decrease or increase. We solve the model and compute the welfare
gains using the same procedures as before but subject to the above pricing equations.
In Table 2.6 we report the results for various values of ν. Risk aversion implies foreign
investors demand a premium above the spread necessary to compensate default risk,
making debt more expensive and discouraging borrowing. But foreign investors also
demand an extra compensation for risk when selling put options, making the options
also more expensive. However, hedging has now an extra channel through which it
could increase welfare, through its effect on the risk premium demanded by foreign
investors, which depends on the risk of default. Our quantitative analysis in Table
2.6 suggests that the welfare gains are larger as foreign investors become more risk
averse, i.e. ν increases, despite the higher upfront cost of insurance.
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Table 2.6: Risk Averse Investors: Hedging and No-hedging Economies
Welfare Gains (%) Debt (%) Default Spreads (%) Default Prob. (%) Cost Premium
Overall Hedging No Hedging Hedging No Hedging Hedging No Hedging Hedging
ν = 0 0.44 11.97 10.50 1.40 1.59 1.27 1.41 2.52
ν = 0.25 0.44 11.77 10.59 1.24 1.89 0.86 1.30 2.10
ν = 0.5 0.59 13.03 11.35 1.45 2.42 0.50 1.10 2.06
ν = 0.75 0.98 17.82 14.15 2.20 2.44 0.32 0.46 2.08
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: We run 100 Monte Carlo simulations of 2,000 periods each for the economies
with and without hedging. The initial 500 periods are dropped for each simulation.
The reported debt ratio and spreads are calculated as the average values, across
periods and simulations, excluding default episodes for each economy. The probability
of default is calculated as the average fraction, across periods and simulations, of
default periods. Welfare gains are calculated by constructing simulations for both
economies subject to the same stochastic shocks and initial conditions, and then
computing the present discounted value of the utility of consumption to ultimately
express the difference in terms of consumption equivalents.
2.7 Conclusion
The sharp unexpected decline in oil prices during 2014-2016 renewed the interest
in designing policies to manage such risks in countries highly exposed to swings in
commodity prices. Discussions about the various alternatives to countries often start
with Mexico, given its longstanding practice of hedging through put options, but
analyses of the welfare gains of such policy have been limited. This paper attempts to
fill this gap and derives lessons about the benefits and costs for commodity exporters
of using market insurance to hedge commodity price risk.
We have focused our analysis on the role of hedging instruments as a complement
to defaultable debt, which in and on itself can be seen as a hedging strategy. Our
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quantitative assessment concludes that the welfare gains from hedging, in the pres-
ence of defaultable debt, can be equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of
about 0.44 percent. We also find that about 90 percent of these gains stem from a re-
duction in borrowing costs and the difference from income smoothing. The beneficial
role of hedging is robust to numerous sensitivity analyses.
In terms of lessons for the design of a program like Mexico’s, the welfare gains
are lower when option prices exceed their actuarially fair value, a circumstance that
may become more likely when using relatively illiquid, over-the-counter options. It
may then be worth accepting some base risk to ensure hedging is welfare enhancing.
Nevertheless, the model suggests that the premium above the actuarially fair price
would have to be very large for the welfare gains to decline to zero.
The model also suggests that selling oil forward generates larger welfare gains than
hedging through put options. However, political economy considerations cannot be
ignored since selling oil forward implies giving up any potential revenue windfall if oil
prices rise. Mexico, through the use of options, seems to have found a good balance
between these political economy constraints and the benefits of market instruments
to hedge oil price risk.
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Figure 2.6: Event Windows
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The event windows are selected by first running an 11,000-period simulation
for the hedging and no-hedging economies. After dropping the first 1,000 periods,
we identify all default episodes by the no-hedging economy in the remaining 10,000
periods and compute the average evolution of the selected variables depicted in the
charts.
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Figure 2.7: Welfare Gains under Different Cost Premiums
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Unconditional welfare gains as a function of the cost premium x, expressed as






“As I have stated before, it is the private sector, not the public sector,
that is in the best position to provide effective supervision.”1
— Larry Summers in 2000
“No substantially interconnected institution or market on which the
system depends should be free from rigorous public scrutiny.”2
— Larry Summers in 2009
1See “Remarks of Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers to the Securities Industry Asso-
ciation” on Nov. 9, 2000 at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
ls1005.aspx.
2See “Remarks of Lawrence H. Summers Director of the National Economic Council Re-
sponding to an Historic Economic Crisis: The Obama Program” on March 13, 2009 at https:
//www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/0313_summers_remarks.pdf.
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CHAPTER 3. SELF-REGULATION VERSUS GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
AN EXTERNALITY VIEW
3.1 Introduction
Self-regulation has been a feature for many industries and professions throughout
the world. In the U.S. financial markets, all firms dealing with securities are required
to be members in one of two self-regulatory organizations (SROs): Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
These SROs license their members, write and examine rules for market players, and
are themselves also subject to government regulation.3 Self-regulation is not a unique
feature for security markets but also exists in other industries such as the nuclear and
chemical industry. Interestingly, a similar arrangement is prevalent in many profes-
sions such as accounting, law and medicine. Moreover, self-regulation is a worldwide
phenomenon. For example, the Swiss Banker Association plays an important role
in implementing banking regulation in Switzerland, and the Advertising Standards
Authority conducts regulation in the UK advertising industry.
The existence of self-regulation has confused many people for a long time due
to the conventional belief that a private organization can never achieve efficient and
effective market discipline given its internal conflict of interest. From the quotes at
the beginning of the introduction, it is not hard to see the stark difference between
Larry Summers before and after the Great Recession, where he discusses how to
allocate the regulatory power between the private and public sector. Indeed, the
3For a detailed description for FINRA, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_
Industry_Regulatory_Authority.
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allocation of regulatory power between an SRO and government has significant welfare
implications. Given its widespread popularity in different industries, one might expect
a comprehensive understanding of self-regulation versus government regulation in the
literature. However, some fundamental questions are still unclear. For example, what
is the trade-off between industrial self-regulation and government regulation? What
is the optimal regulatory mechanism when regulating an industry? In this paper, I
provide a simple theoretical framework to understand these questions.
Broadly speaking, self-regulation refers to the phenomenon in which an industry
establishes a private organization to exercise regulatory authority over the indus-
try members. Obviously, the effectiveness of self-regulation depends on whether the
government grants an SRO regulatory power. In some industries, the government
delegates regulatory power to private sectors, such as FINRA in the securities mar-
ket. In other industries, however, the government still controls regulatory power, but
the SRO significantly affects industry regulation, such as the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operation in the nuclear industry and the American Medical Association in
the medical profession. These are typical examples of regulatory capture. In either
case, self-regulation can be conducted in an effective way and can shape the industry’s
regulatory policy. In this paper, I refer to self-regulation as cases where an SRO has
de facto regulation over the industry.
There are many explanations for the emergence of self-regulation, such as asym-
metric information, externalities, forestalling public intervention, moral concerns, etc.
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In this paper, I take an externality view and analyze the scope of self-regulation in
addressing market inefficiencies in the economy. By introducing a simple general the-
oretical framework, I investigate the trade-off between self-regulation and government
regulation. In the end, I also analyze the optimal regulatory mechanism and apply
theoretical insights to real-world observations and ongoing policy debates.
In the model, there are three elements affecting the trade-off between self-regulation
and government regulation. The first element is about the externalities in the econ-
omy. Depending on who is affected, the different types of externalities make a large
difference. An SRO has an incentive to internalize any externalities within the in-
dustry but has no incentive to internalize externalities to the rest of society. Even
worse, the SRO’s behavior might exacerbate such externalities to society. The gov-
ernment, on the other hand, has an incentive to correct any types of externalities.
The second element is about monopoly distortions. Self-regulation is usually associ-
ated with monopoly power since an SRO can coordinate industry behavior through
regulation. The last element is about asymmetric information. Government regula-
tion can correct any externalities if the government has perfect information about the
economy. The existence of asymmetric information between the public and private
sector renders the effectiveness of government regulation and thus creates a role for
self-regulation.
To fully understand this trade-off, I impose more informational structure and
apply a second-order approximation following Weitzman (1974) and Laffont (1977).
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I find that self-regulation is more desirable than government regulation if the degree
of asymmetric information is larger than the size of monopoly distortion and the
externalities to society. Moreover, not all information asymmetries matter for this
trade-off. In particular, the asymmetric information about the externalities to the
rest of society does not matter as long as it is uncorrelated with the asymmetric
information about other externalities. The intuition is as follows. An SRO has no
incentive to utilize information on the externalities to the rest of society for the
regulation on its own industry. Even if the government has an incentive to correct
such externalities, the regulation is not effective due to the asymmetric information
issue. As a result, asymmetric information does not affect the trade-off between
self-regulation and government regulation.
I also derive an optimal regulatory mechanism in this economy. The general
message is to combine both self-regulation and government regulation where self-
regulation aims at correcting externalities within the sector, and government reg-
ulation aims at correcting any distortions from self-regulation. Depending on the
information structure of the government, the first best allocation might not be im-
plementable. In particular, if the government does not have information about the
externalities to society, the first best can never be achieved since an SRO has no
incentive to utilize such information. But a second best allocation can be achieved as
long as the government has enough information to correct the monopolistic distortions
generated by the SRO.
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The insights of the general framework can be applied to many empirical observa-
tions and theoretical works. I provide several arguments to apply this insight in order
to understand regulatory arrangements in many different industries. I argue that the
degree of the three elements identified in this paper plays an important role. Fur-
thermore, their relative importance can change with the development of industries.
Moreover, the insights can be applied to many policy discussions. I argue that there
should be a room for self-regulation other than government regulation.
Literature Review This paper is related to several strands of literature. In
particular, it is related to the literature on industrial self-regulation.4 Existing work
has focused on the reasons that firms want to join the SROs for self-regulation in
different industries. For example, King et al. (2011) provides an excellent survey
of the adoption of industry self-regulation. Maxwell et al. (2000) provides both a
theoretical and empirical work to argue that firms form self-regulation to preempt
government regulations. Lyon and Maxwell (2003) and Lyon and Maxwell (2012)
analyze the welfare implication of self-regulation with the interaction of government.
Departing from this literature, this paper takes an externality view and focuses on
the scope of self-regulation.
This paper is also related to the literature investigating the benefits and costs of
self-regulation. There is evidence that self-regulation tends to generate monopolistic
distorations. For example, Shaked and Sutton (1981) argue that a professional group
4For example, there are many theoretical work on self-regulation in financial markets including
Núñez (2001), Stefanadis (2003), DeMarzo et al. (2005), Núñez (2007) and Aboura and Lepinette
(2014), etc.
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tends to restrict the number of members to gain monopoly power. Moreover, Pirrong
(1995) argues that self-regulation is a weak tool to prevent monopoly power by an-
alyzing the self-regulation of commodity exchanges. There is some evidence that an
SRO tends to behave in favor of the industry rather than consumers (see DeMarzo
et al. (2005)). Even so, there are still benefits for the existence of self-regulation.
For example, Carson (2011) argues that self-regulation is important for emerging
markets to develop financial markets. Leland (1979), Gehrig and Jost (1995) and
Shapiro (1986) model the economic benefit of self-regulation as reducing asymmetric
information and argue that its existence might improve the welfare of society. This
paper provides a general framework to analyze the trade-off between self-regulation
and government regulation.5 Consistent with the literature, I argue that government
regulation improves the effectiveness of self-regulation. For example, Kondo (2007)
provides evidence that more control of an SRO over customer–firm dispute resolution
increases the level of enforcement against a firm’s misbehavior. Moreover, DeMarzo
et al. (2005) show that government oversight is desirable to reduce the misbehavior
of the SRO.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 presents the general model;
Section 3.3 derives an optimal regulatory mechanism; Section 3.4 provides several
applications; and Section 3.5 concludes.
5Grajzl and Murrell (2007) also pursue the question of self-regulation versus government as an
allocation of lawmaking power and identify conditions for improving social welfare. However, my
work is more general than theirs and can be applied to other fields other than lawmaking as well.
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3.2 The Model
In this section, I provide a simple general framework to analyze the scope of
self-regulation and government regulation.
3.2.1 Environment
The economy consists of two sectors: producers and consumers, where each sector
has a continuum of individual agents. There is only one good in the economy, which
is traded at a market price p. There is a case for regulation in this economy due
to the existence of externalities.6 It is assumed that there are two types of exter-
nalities, which are generated by producers and negatively affect both producers and
consumers. Hence, there is a case for industrial self-regulation to internalize externali-
ties within the producer sector. There is also room for government regulation because
producers have no incentive to internalize the externalities affecting consumers.
Producers There is a continuum of producers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Producer i
produces good xi at a cost of c(xi; θ), where xi denotes the quantity of the good
and θ summarizes all the parameters in the cost function. Moreover, there is a
general equilibrium effect on individual profit captured by the term C(X; Θ), where
X =
∫
xidi is the overall production of the good and Θ is the parameter. This general
6To simplify analysis, I do not provide a micro-foundation for such externalities. In the applica-
tions, I provide examples to illustrate how such externalities might evolve.
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equilibrium effet is a negative externality from production, which hurts the producer
sector. One rationale is the existence of a production externality: excessive production
leads to a reduction of profit for individual production. Presumably, c′ > 0, C ′ > 0
and c′′ > 0, C ′′ > 0 are imposed. The profit Πi for individual producer i is given by
Πi = pxi − c(xi; θ)− C(X; Θ)
Consumers There is a continuum of consumers indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Consumer j
buys consumption good yj from producers at price p. Moreover, the consumer’s utility
function takes the form of u(yj;φ), where yj is the individual demand of consumer j
and φ is the parameter. Similarly, there is an additional term U(X; Φ) rationalized
as consumption externalities where Φ summarizes the parameters. It is assumed that
u′ > 0, U ′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, U ′′ > 0. The utility U j for consumer j is given by
U j = u(yj;φ)− pyj − U(X; Φ)
Competitive Equilibrium consists of an allocation (xCEi , y
CE
j ) and price p such that
under price p, xCEi maximizes Π
i and yCEj maximizes U
j for ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
the market clears, i.e., XCE =
∫ 1
0





Given the definition of competitive equilibrium, one can solve the optimality con-
115
CHAPTER 3. SELF-REGULATION VERSUS GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
AN EXTERNALITY VIEW
dition for XCE, which satisfies
u′(XCE;φ) = c′(XCE; θ) (3.1)
First Best Allocation Unsurprisingly, the allocation under competitive equilibrium
is not socially optimal given the existence of externalities in the economy. To formal-
ize the idea, we define the first best allocation as the one chosen by a utilitarian social
planner who cares equally about consumers and producers. As is noted later, such
an allocation should be considered as the first best allocation since there is no asym-
metric information between the social planner and private agents. The social planner
can improve the collective welfare of consumers and producers by internalizing both
the technology externality and consumption externality. The planner’s optimization
problem is given as follows:
max
X
u(X;φ)− U(X; Φ)− c(X; θ)− C(X; Θ)





= U ′(XFB; Φ) + c′(XFB; θ) + C ′(XFB; θ) (3.2)
Inefficiency of Competitive Equilibrium By comparing the optimality condi-
tions (3.1) and (3.2), it is not hard to see that XCE > XFB since U ′, C ′ > 0. In
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other words, there is an over-production in competitive equilibrium. This result is
straightforward since both producers and consumers fail to internalize the externality
terms.7
Implementation of First Best Allocation Intuitively, implementation of the first
best allocation requires a knowledge of all the parameters such as {θ,Θ, φ,Φ}. As
we will show later, all the government needs to know is the information about the
consumer side, {φ,Φ}. By joining with an industrial self-regulatory organization, the
first best allocation can be implemented.
3.2.2 Government Regulation and Industrial Self-
Regulation
Regulation is justified since there is a discrepancy between competitive equilibrium
and the first best allocation. The interesting question is who should conduct regula-
tion: an SRO representing producers or a government representing both consumers
and producers. As discussed before, the SRO has an incentive to internalize the
externalities within the producer sector but not the externalities to the consumers.
7It is the producers who should bear the blame for over-production because the externality term
depends on total production by assumption. However, total production equals total consumption
in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is possible that consumers are also responsible for the inefficiency if
the externality term depends on total consumption.
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Moreover, it generates monopolistic distortions.8 Hence, government regulation is
needed to address such concerns. However, there might be an asymmetric informa-
tion issue for the government. It is reasonable to assume that producers have a better
information structure than the government. Specifically, we assume that producers
can perfectly observe the information structure F = {θ,Θ, φ,Φ}, while the govern-
ment cannot observe all of them. Instead, the government has a prior distribution
over F . Hence, there is a trade-off between government regulation and self-regulation.
Lemma 1. Government Regulation
A benevolent government chooses allocation XG < XCE to maximize expected social
welfare. To implement XG, it can put restrictions on individual production xi.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.1.
A brief comparison between the first best allocation XFB and the allocation under
government regulation XG reveals the inferior information structure of government.
Ex ante, XG implements XFB based on the government’s information structure. Ex
post, there is some discrepancy since XFB is a function of parameters in F while XG is
constant. This difference captures two types of cost for government regulation in real-
ity. First, government regulation suffers from asymmetric information. The inability
of precisely targeting the source of externalities becomes a distortion for government
8Indeed, correcting externalities to consumers requires a reduction in production, the same result
when the SRO exerts monopolistic distortion. However, the magnitude of reduction in production
might differ. Furthermore, depending on assumptions, correcting externalities to consumers might
call for an increase in production.
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regulation. Second, even if the government has the same information structure as
the private sector, government regulation is inflexible to changing parameters due to
many other restrictions, such as budget constraints, political processes, etc.
An SRO plays a role in regulation since it has a superior information structure.
But it also has two types of costs due to the incentive problem. Since an SRO has
the power to set rules in coordinating industry-level production, it can effectively
introduce monopoly power in many respects, such as choosing an industry standard
to restrict supply as in Leland (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1981). Here, I simply
model the monopoly distortion by assuming that an SRO can perfectly observe a
downward-sloping demand curve defined by p(X;φ) = u′(X;φ). Furthermore, the
SRO has no incentive to internalize externalities to consumers U(X; Φ) even if they
can observe the externality parameter Φ perfectly.
Lemma 2. Self-Regulation
An SRO chooses industry production level XS < XCE to maximize the collective
profit of producers. It can implement XS by putting production restrictions on the
industry.9
Proof. See Appendix C.1.2
There is no conflict of interest between an SRO and an individual producer since
the SRO and the individual producer share the same profit function. By internalizing
9It might seem strange to claim that an SRO could choose production level since it violates anti-
trust law. But effectively, an SRO can affect individual choice of production by choosing regulation
rules and achieve its ideal production level.
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the production externality and pursuing monopoly rent, the profit of the industry
has been increased. However, this might hurt the welfare of consumers. Specifically,
there are two distortions with self-regulation: the monopoly distortion captured by
the term u′′(XS;φ)XS and the externalities to consumers captured by U(XS; Θ).
3.2.3 Trade-off of Self-Regulation Versus Govern-
ment Regulation
From the analysis in Lemma 1 and 2, neither government regulation nor self-
regulation can implement the first best allocationXFB. A natural question to consider
is the trade-off between self-regulation and government regulation. Specifically, if one
has to choose between industrial self-regulation and government regulation, what
factors should be considered? To answer this question, I define the following welfare
function ∆S/G, which measures the welfare benefit of self-regulation over government
regulation under the information structure of government. Presumably, one prefers
self-regulation if ∆S/G > 0, and government regulation otherwise.
∆S/G ≡ E[W (XS;F)−W (XG;F)]
≡ E[u(XS;φ)− U(XS; Φ)− c(XS; θ)− C(XS; Θ)]
− E[u(XG;φ)− U(XG; Φ)− c(XG; θ)− C(XG; Θ)]
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where the expectation is taken over the prior distribution of information structure F .
To get an analytical solution for ∆S/G, I follow Weitzman (1974) and Laffont
(1977) to impose information structure in the model and apply a second-order ap-
proximation. Specifically, functions u, U, c, C can be approximated around x = XG





+ [ū′ + φ](x−XG) + 1
2
ū′′(x−XG)2




+ [Ū ′ + Φ](X −XG) + 1
2
Ū ′′(X −XG)2




+ [c̄′ + θ](x−XG) + 1
2
c̄′′(x−XG)2




+ [C̄ ′ + Θ](X −XG) + 1
2
C̄ ′′(X −XG)2
The restrictions on information structure imply that information asymmetries F
only appear up to the first-order derivatives. To normalize, I assume the parameters
have zero mean and denote their variance by σ2F . Moreover, the parameters in F are
uncorrelated.
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Ψ ≡ − ū
′′ − Ū ′′ − c̄′′ − C̄ ′′
(ū′′ − c̄′′ − C̄ ′′ + ū′′)2
> 0
The advantage of self-regulation comes from the SRO’s superior information struc-
ture. Information about φ, θ and Φ improves the efficiency of self-regulation over
10Apply the approximation for optimality conditions (C.1) and (C.2).
0 = E[u′(XG;φ)− U ′(XG; Φ)− c′(XG; θ)− C ′(XG; Θ)]
≈ E[ū′ + φ− Ū ′ − Φ− c̄′ − θ − C̄ ′ −Θ]
= ū′ − Ū ′ − c̄′ − C̄ ′
0 = u′(XS ;φ) + u′′(XS ;φ)XS − c′(XS ; θ)− C ′(XS ; Θ)
≈ ū′ + φ+ ū′′XS − c̄′ − θ − C̄ ′ −Θ + (ū′′ − c̄′′ − C̄ ′′)(XS −XG)
= Ū ′ + φ− θ −Θ + ū′′XS + (ū′′ − c̄′′ − C̄ ′′)(XS −XG)
The difference between XG and XS can thus be written as
XS −XG = − ū
′′XG + Ū ′ + φ− θ −Θ
ū′′ − c̄′′ − C̄ ′′ + ū′′
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government regulation. Since XS is a function of φ, θ and Θ, it represents an in-
herent regulatory advantage of self-regulation. But superior information can also
create distortions. The second component in the bracket of benefit of self-regulation,
Ū ′′+ū′′
ū′′−Ū ′′−c̄′′−C̄′′ captures the distortions associated with its superior information. Ū
′′
captures the externalities to consumers while ū′′ captures the monopolistic distor-
tion. If there is large asymmetric information about the externalities to consumers,
the effectiveness of government regulation is reduced. If the monopolistic distortion is
very large, captured by a large curvature of individual utility function u(·), it is better
to use government regulation since an SRO simply uses its superior information to
generate monopolistic distortion.
As noted before, there are two types of distortions with an SRO. First, the SRO
has an incentive to create monopoly distortions. This is captured by two pieces: one
is associated with its superior information captured by the term ū′′ in the bracket of
benefit of self-regulation, and the other is not related to information captured by the
term ū′′XG in the bracket of cost of self-regulation. Second, the SRO has no incentive
to internalize its effect on consumers even if it has superior information about F . The
distortions are captured by Ū ′′ and Ū ′ respectively in the second term of bracket in
the benefit and cost of self-regulation.
There is one further interesting result from this approximation: information about
Φ is irrelevant if it is not correlated with other parameters. The reason is that only the
government cares about the externalities to consumers. But an SRO has no use for
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such information since Φ does not affect its profit function. Only if Φ could provide
information about other unknown parameters will it affect the trade-off between self-
regulation and government regulation.
Claim 1. Trade-off of Self-Regulation Versus Government Regulation
The trade-off of self-regulation versus government regulation depends on three ele-
ments: the degree of asymmetric information, the size of monopoly distortions and
the externalities to consumers. Self-regulation is more desirable if
• degree of asymmetric information is large;
• size of monopoly distortions is small;
• size of externalities to consumers is small.
Moreover, the asymmetric information about externalities to consumers is irrelevant
for the trade-off unless it provides information about other sources of asymmetric
information in the economy.
3.3 Optimal Regulatory Mechanism
I have established the trade-off between self-regulation and government regulation
in the economy. One interesting question is how to utilize the benefits of both the
SRO and the government and thus provide an optimal regulatory mechanism. To
understand this question, we start from a case in which the government has perfect
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information such that the first best allocation XFB can be implemented. Then we
introduce the asymmetric information problem as before and analyze the optimal
regulatory mechanism in this setting.
Proposition 7. Optimal Regulation Under Perfect Information
If government can observe F , it can implement the first best allocation XFB using
the following three mechanisms:
1. Regulating individual consumers by a Pigovian tax τ = U ′(XFB; Φ)+C ′(XFB; Θ)
that is rebated by T = τXFB or a quantity restriction yj ≤ XFB.
2. Regulating individual producers by a Pigovian tax τ ∗0 = −U ′(XFB; Φ)−C ′(XFB; Θ)
that is rebated by T ∗0 = −τ ∗0XFB or a quantity restriction xi ≤ XFB.
3. Regulating an SRO by a Pigovian tax τ ∗1 = −U ′(XFB; Φ)− u′′(XFB;φ)XFB on
production that is rebated by T ∗0 = −τ ∗1XFB.
Moreover, if τ ∗1 > 0, the government can implement the first best allocation X
FB by
delegating regulatory power to a specific number of multiple SROs.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.3
Proposition 7 provides a benchmark to implement the first best allocation. Clearly,
there is not much room for self-regulation if the government has the same informa-
tion structure as the production sector. In terms of implementation, it is equivalent
to purely regulating the consumers or the producers since the demand and supply
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coincide in equilibrium.11 Furthermore, there is an equivalent result between price-
and quantity-based regulation, a well-known result in the literature, as in Weitzman
(1974).
As for the role of self-regulation, government regulation is needed to correct any
distortions generated by an SRO. Only if the monopolistic distortions generated by
the SRO is larger than the externalities to consumers does there exist a specific
market stucture such that the first best allocation can be implemented by the self-
regulation. The intuition is straightforward. When the monopolistic distortion is
large enough, one SRO tends to reduce production too excessively. The resulting
equilibrium with self-regulation is under-production with respect to the first best
allocation. Introducing competition between SROs increases production, which moves
the equilibrium toward the first best allocation.
The question becomes more interesting once the government has limited informa-
tion about F . Intuitively, the industry knows F and utilizes it in its decision-making
process. However, the information about Φ plays no role in an SRO’s choice XS due
to a lack of incentive. Therefore, unless government has information about Φ, the
first best allocation cannot be achieved. In such a scenario, one can expect that the
maximum social welfare in an environment where government and an SRO cooperates
11One direct implication is that government can regulate both the consumers and producers to
implement the first best allocation. For simplicity, Proposition 7 only considers regulations either
on consumers or producers. For the analysis below, I focus on the regulations on the producer side.
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is W̄ , which is a second best benchmark.
W̄ = max
X
u(X;φ)− E[U(X; Φ)]− c(X; θ)− C(X; Θ) (3.3)
It is reasonable to argue that an SRO has the same incentive as the government
to reduce externalities in the industry. From that perspective, information about
θ and Θ can be utilized properly even if the government does not know directly.
The difficulty comes from information about φ. An SRO has a distorted incentive to
extract monopoly rent. Therefore, knowledge about φ determines the implementation
of the second best social welfare W̄ .
Proposition 8. Optimal Regulation If Government Knows Demand Infor-
mation If the government knows demand information φ, the second best allocation W̄
can be implemented. Specifically, the government announces a Pigovian tax formula
τ(X;φ) = −u′(X;φ) + u(X;φ)−E[U(X;Φ)]
X
to an SRO to replace its demand function.
Meanwhile, an SRO is subsidized by a lump-sum transfer T = −τ(X;φ)X.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.4.
The intuition behind Proposition 8 is as follows. The SRO has an incentive to
internalize the externalities within the production sector. Hence, the government
does not need to know the parameters about such externalities. Instead, the SRO
has no incentive to internalize the externalities to consumers, whose information
asymmetry matters for the government regulation. If the government only knows the
127
CHAPTER 3. SELF-REGULATION VERSUS GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
AN EXTERNALITY VIEW
demand information φ, it can announce a tax schedule to correct the monopolistic
distortions from the SRO and implement the second best allocation. Furthermore,
if the government also knows the externality parameter Φ, the first best allocation
XFB can be implemented (see Corollary 1).
Corollary 1. If the government knows demand information φ and externalities pa-
rameter Φ, the first best allocation XFB can be implemented. Specifically, the govern-
ment announces a Pigovian tax formula τ(X;φ,Φ) = −u′(X;φ) + u(X;φ)−U(X;Φ)
X
to an
SRO to replace its demand function. Meanwhile, an SRO is subsidized by a lump-sum
transfer T = −τ(X;φ,Φ)X.
The second best allocation cannot be implemented if the government has no in-
formation about φ, which delivers a similar message as in Armstrong and Sappington
(2007).12 In such scenarios, the relative social welfare function should be revised, and
I define the following social welfare function W̄ .
W̄ = max
X
E[u(X;φ)− U(X; Φ)]− c(X; θ)− C(X; Θ)
Proposition 9. Optimal Regulation for Unknown Demand Information
If the government does not know demand information φ, the second best allocation
W̄ cannot be implemented. Only W̄ can be implemented through price regulation.
12In Armstrong and Sappington (2007), they summarize the insights about regulating a monopoly
and claim that the first best can be implemented if the regulator knows consumer demand. Here in
my settings, if the government knows the demand parameter φ, it can only implement the second
best since the government also needs to know the externality parameter Φ.
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Specifically, the government buys goods according to a price menu where P (X) =
E[u′(X;φ)− U ′(X; Φ)].
Proof. See Appendix C.1.5.
The general message from Proposition 7, 8 and 9 can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, that optimal mechanisms consist of government regulation, which corrects
monopoly distortions and externalities to consumers; and self-regulation, which cor-
rects externalities to producers. Second, the first best allocation can be implemented
if the government knows at least the information about the demand parameter φ and
externality parameter Φ.
3.4 Applications
In this section, I provide several empirical and theoretical applications for my
general framework. The goal is twofold. First, I apply the insights from the previ-
ous analysis to understand many empirical observations in the real world, especially
why self-regulation is more desirable than government regulation in some industries.
Second, I argue that the idea of self-regulation should be added into some ongoing
policy discussions, such as banking regulation.
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3.4.1 Mapping to the Real World
In the real world, many industries have self-regulations. One important question
is why self-regulation emerges in some markets and whether such arrangements are
socially desirable. The key insight from Claim 1 is essentially a benefit/cost analysis
based on three elements: the degree of asymmetric information, the size of monopoly
distortions, and the size of externalities to consumers. Whenever the degree of asym-
metric information about the externalities in the industry is larger than the size of
monopoly distortion and the externalities to consumers, self-regulation is superior to
government regulation. To understand different regulatory mechanisms in different
markets, one need to quantify these three elements. Although it is difficult to quantify
all three components in the data, one can still make inferences based on subjective
judgments.
For example, in the nuclear industry, the role of INPO is to set rules and standards
for its members since writing such criteria requires specific knowledge and working
experience. It is more efficient for the industry expert to do so, which justifies the
scope for self-regulation. The monopoly distortion from the nuclear industry tends
to be small since products from the nuclear industry can be perfectly substituted
by products from the traditional power industry. Even if the externalities from the
nuclear industry to the general public are catastrophic, the probability of such events
is small and tends to be declining as technology improves. Overall analysis suggests
that the benefit of self-regulation overrides the cost. Therefore, it is reasonable to
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have self-regulation in the nuclear industry.
Similar arguments can be applied to the securities market. The asymmetric in-
formation about the externalities between different securities firms is very large since
consumers cannot perfectly observe service quality provided by each firm. Without
regulations in this market, one firm’s misbehavior will tend to negatively affect other
firms through the industry’s reputation. Self-regulation can improve the efficiency by
regulating the provision of high-quality service and reducing the negative externali-
ties among different firms. Meanwhile, monopoly distortions in the security market
are low since consumers can always deposit their money into a traditional banking
account. Also, externalities from the securities market to society are small and even
close to zero. Therefore, the economic benefit of self-regulation is larger than its cost.
It is also interesting to apply the general insight to self-regulation in the banking
industry. Before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, the banking in-
dustry was de facto self-regulated by the New York Clearing House. Afterwards, the
self-regulation was replaced by government regulation. My model can help under-
stand such a change. The asymmetric information about the negative externalities
between banks used to be large since it was hard for outsiders to understand their
internal operation. Today, the government has a better understanding of the banking
business, which significantly reduces the information asymmetries. The monopoly
distortion also becomes large since the banking industry provides a comprehensive
financial service to the general public. Moreover, the externalities from the banking
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sector to society are very large, as documented by Bernanke (1983).13 Given the dy-
namic changes in the banking industry, it was reasonable to have self-regulation in the
early days and government regulation today. Nonetheless, it is still worth considering
self-regulation as complementary given its flexibility to a changing environment. In
the next subsection, I argue that due to the increasing complexity of externalities in
the banking sector, the idea of self-regulation is worth considering.
3.4.2 Theoretical Applications
The general insights in our theoretical framework could be applied to many on-
going policy discussions such as macroprudential and banking regulation. In this
section, I provide one simple example in the literature that can be mapped into a
general theoretical framework.
In the macro/finance literature, two types of distortions are widely analyzed to
justify financial regulation—bailout externality and pecuniary externality (see Farhi
and Tirole (2012), Keister (2015), Jeanne and Korinek (2010a), Ma (2017), etc.).
Bailout funds are essentially externalities from the banking sector (producers in our
model) to the general public (consumers) and fire-sale externalities are negative ef-
fects between banks. These two types of externalities correspond to consumption
externalities U(X; Φ) and production externality C(X; Θ) in my general framework.
Therefore, policy discussions based on these types of models should have room for self-
13The externalities are even larger given the existence of deposit insurance and bailout funds.
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regulation. Surprisingly, current policy discussion does not have it. In this section,
I provide a simple model with the flavor of both fire-sale externalities and bailout in
the spirit of Jeanne and Korinek (2010a) and Jeanne and Korinek (2010b) to analyze
the potential role for self-regulation. In the end, I argue that self-regulation should
be considered as an alternative to current policy discussions.
The model consists of three time periods t = 0, 1, 2 and is inhabited by two types of
atomistic agents of mass 1, bankers and investors. Bankers are assumed to be natural
borrowers and need to borrow at period 0 and 1 in order to smooth consumption.
Investors are assumed to be natural lenders and have affluent endowments available in
three periods. The critical feature of this model is a collateral borrowing constraint,
as in Jeanne and Korinek (2010a).
Specifically, Bankers have equity e in period 0 and issue debt d1 to satisfy their
consumption c0. In period 1, after repaying debt d1,
14 bankers receive an income
shock ẽ and 1 unit of asset, which yields a fixed payment y at period 2. Meanwhile,
bankers decide the share of asset κ to hold in period 2 and issue another debt d2 to
satisfy consumption c1. In period 2, bankers receive the payoff from the asset, repay
the debt d2, and consume the remaining amount. However, the bankers’ ability to roll
over the debt is affected by an imperfect collateral constraint where its value depends
on the collateral value. Intuitively, this financial constraint can be rationalized as a
limited enforcement or commitment problem in the financial market and thus creates
14Here, the interest rate R can be normalized to 1 due to the specific setting of an investor’s utility
function.
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pecuniary externalities. The financial constraint can be expressed as follows.
d2 ≤ φp
where φ < 1 captures the financial friction.
The utility function of the bankers is assumed to be UB = c0 + u(c1) + c2, where
in the last period the utility function is assumed to be risk neutral for convenience.
Investors are assumed to have an abundant endowment, and their utility functions





The problem can be solved using backward induction. In period 1, depending on
the realization of net worth m = ẽ− d1 there are two states: the unconstrained state
where no fire sale happens and the constrained state where the individual banker
fire sells his asset. The fire sale creates inefficiencies because the individual does
not realize that the asset price is a downward-sloping function and depends on the
aggregate net worth of the banking sector, M . In order to map the problem into my
general setup, I leave the derivation of value function in Appendix C.2 and write the
134
CHAPTER 3. SELF-REGULATION VERSUS GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
AN EXTERNALITY VIEW
banker’s optimality problem in the fashion of value function in period 0, i.e.
max
d0
c0 + E[V (m;M)]
s.t. c0 = d0





+E[V (ẽ− d0, Ẽ −D0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−c(x;θ)−C(X;Θ)
To see how this can be mapped into the general framework in Section 3.2, notice that
the price of d0 is 1 and the E[V (m;M)] is the utility function −c(x; θ) − C(X; Θ)
for producers, where {θ,Θ} = {ẽ, φ}. The appearance of negative externalities in
the banking sector provides room for self-regulation and could yield some economic
benefit especially when {θ,Θ} is unobservable to government.
As to the economic cost of self-regulation, one needs to look at the consumers’
utility. In the simple case where it is linear and without bailout, there is no cost
of self-regulation. But one can imagine that consumers have the utility form of





′ > 0, u′′ < 0. Then the monopoly distortions need to
be taken into account. As for the externalities from the banking sector to society,
one needs to think of the existence of bailouts. Imagine that in period 1, whenever
there is a binding constraint, the government will bail out the banks. Suppose that
the government can only mitigate part of the constraint due to the cost of taxation.
Then there is a tax function T in period 1 deducted from consumer’s utility and this
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T depends on the aggregate level of M . This T function corresponds to the U(X; Φ)
function in my general framework and should be taken into account for the discussion
of self-regulation in the banking sector.
Notice that correcting fire-sale externalities requires superior information about
{θ,Θ}. Without such information, the policy recommendation, such as the Pigo-
vian tax in Jeanne and Korinek (2010a) is ineffective. Self-regulation, however, could
reduce such information asymmetries. An optimal regulatory mechanism in the bank-
ing sector should include both government regulation and self-regulation where both
focus on different sources of externalities in the economy.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a simple framework for the analysis of self-regulation versus
government regulation. I argue that three elements are crucial for the trade-off: exter-
nalities, monopoly distortions, and the degree of asymmetric information. Whenever
the degree of asymmetric information is larger than the size of monopoly distortions
and externalities to society, it is worthwhile to have self-regulation. Moreover, an
optimal mechanism consists of both self-regulation and government regulation where
self-regulation focuses on externalities in the industry, and government regulation
focuses on monopoly distortion and externalities to society.
Based on these insights, I provide some examples to understand real-world ob-
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servations. Moreover, my work can shed light on current ongoing policy discussions.
As long as an economy has the three elements identified in this paper, there is room
for analysis of self-regulation versus government regulation. One general takeaway is
that optimal regulatory mechanisms should take self-regulation into account.
Future work needs to be done on this paper. For example, the SRO in my model
has the same incentive as the government to internalize the negative externalities
and does not have a conflict of interest for misusing the superior information from
a social perspective. It can enrich the model predictions if the conflict of interest
is introduced in the model. Moreover, there is no asymmetric information between
producers and consumers in my model. It is interesting to analyze these cases because
it might increase the case for self-regulation. After all, SROs can help allieviate the
asymmetric information and thus faciliate the transactions between producers and
consumers. Last, my model can also be generalized into a dynamic setting in order
to analyze the dynamic trade-off between self-regulation and government regulation.
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A.1 Data Source
The sample includes the following 55 countries:
Algeria Argentina Australia Austria Belgium
Brazil Canada Chile China Colombia
Cote d’Ivoire Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic
Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Finland France
Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Indonesia
Ireland Italy Japan Korea, Rep. Lebanon
Malaysia Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand
Nigeria Norway Pakistan Panama Peru
Philippines Poland Portugal Russian Federation South Africa
Spain Sweden Thailand Tunisia Turkey
Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB
The sources are as follows:
GDP Per Capita Growth: GDP per capita from World Development Indicators
(WDI);
TFP: Pen World Table;
Consumption Share of GDP: calculated using final consumption expenditure
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and GDP data in WDI;
Net Foreign Asset to GDP Ratio: an updated dataset in Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) (see http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html).
A.2 Empirical Results for KM episodes
I use sudden stop episodes as in Korinek and Mendoza (2014) to show the persis-
tent output-level effects of crises. One can see that this effect is robust to identification
of crises. Furthermore, TFP displays a similar pattern to output, as in Figure 1.1.
Figure A.1: Growth Rates in KM episodes (%)
Note: The series are constructed using an 11-year window centering on the sudden stop episodes.
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A.3 Normalized Economy
I normalize the economy by the endogenous variable zt and denote normalized
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A.4 Proofs
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To implement the macroprudential social planner’s allocation, I compare the
normalized optimality conditions of private agents and of the macroprudential social
planner (see Appendix A.3) and find that
τMP,bt =





























)γ − ν̂MPt g−1−γt+1 Î2,t(
ĉht
)−γ
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To implement the multi-instrument social planner’s allocation, I compare the
normalized optimality conditions of private agents and of the multi-instrument social
planner (see Appendix A.3) and find that
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I conduct sensitivity analysis for different parameters in the model. As with the
baseline calibration, I first give values for seven parameters, i.e., {β, ψ, r, γ, α, ρ, σ}: I
only change the value of one parameter while keeping the other parameter values the
same, as in the baseline calibration. Given these values, I choose {κ, h, φ} to match
average growth, the consumption to GDP ratio, and the NFA-GDP ratio. I follow
this strategy because I want the model to match average growth, which is affected
by consumption’s share of GDP and by the NFA-GDP ratio. The sensitivity analysis
results are presented in Table A.1, and I discuss the robustness of my results with
respect to the parameters. One can see that the results do not change with α, since
in the calibration, I assume that the collateral constraint binds in steady state, and
that φ changes with α.
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Impacts on Growth: The negative relationship between average growth and
financial stability for the macroprudential social planner is very robust to all the
parameter values. The multi-instrument social planner could generate a short-run
growth spurt. In the baseline results, the growth spurt lasts for 18 years. I find that
this number varies with different parameter values. Generally speaking, it is related
to the welfare loss in the trend component of the consumption channel. The duration
is longer if the multi-instrument social planner generates fewer welfare losses in this
channel.
Welfare Gains: The results on welfare gains are robust to various parameters.
In particular, I find that the macroprudential social planner can generate welfare
gains equivalent to a 0.06 percent permanent increase in annual consumption, while
the multi-instrument social planner can generate larger gains, equivalent to a 0.24
percent permanent increase in annual consumption. In particular, the size of gains
increases with parameters that affect the size of externalities, such as φ. The gains also
increase with parameters that make growth more sensitive to shocks, such as {ψ, γ}.
Given that the social planners smooth the economy, welfare gains also increase with
parameters that govern risk, such as {ρ, σ}.1 The welfare gains are supposed to
decrease with the discount rate β and the interest rate r, since they decide private
agents’ impatience condition, given by β(1+r)g−γ. Intuitively, when agents are more
impatient, i.e., there is a lower β or r, the economy borrows more and ends up with
1Here, lower ρ implies a higher risk for the economy, since it is more likely to enter a bad state
tomorrow conditional on a good state today.
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more crises. Policy interventions should have more benefits, since they mitigate the
frequency and severity of crises. Indeed, I find larger gains with a lower interest rate.
However, I also find that welfare gains increase with β. This is because β decides the
Euler equation of productivity. High β means that private agents care more about
the reduction of growth during crisis. Hence, policy interventions can generate larger
benefits by reducing this reduction.
Size of Interventions: In the baseline results, I find that the macroprudential
social planner imposes a 1.28 percent capital flows tax, while the multi-instrument
social planner imposes a 1.12 percent capital flows tax and a 1.00 percent subsidy
on growth-enhancing expenditures. Furthermore, there is a difference when looking
at the multi-instrument social planner’s taxes from the ex-ante and the ex-post per-
spective. Generally speaking, the magnitude of the macroprudential capital flows
tax varies with different parameters and depends on the size of externalities and the
ergodic distribution of debt. For the multi-instrument social planner, it is a robust
feature that she taxes borrowing and subsidizes growth-enhancing expenditures ex-
ante. Ex-post, she always taxes growth-enhancing expenditures to relax the borrowing
constraint and might also want to subsidize borrowing, depending on the tightness
of the constraint. Hence, I find that it is not true that the multi-instrument social
planner always imposes a lower ex-ante capital flows tax than the macroprudential
social planner. In some cases, she actually chooses a much higher tax on borrowing,
reflecting a stronger precautionary motive.
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A.6 Numerical Methods for Solving Pol-
icy Functions
I first create a grid space Gb = {b̂0, b̂1, · · · } for the bond holding b̂t and a grid space
Θ = {θ1, · · · , θ5} for the exogenous technology shock θt. The discretization method
for the log AR (1) process of θt follows the Rouwenhorst method, as in Kopecky and
Suen (2010). I apply the endogenous gridpoint method as in Carroll (2006) to iterate
first-order conditions in CE, MP, and MI, and the iteration stops until policy functions
converge. Policy functions in competitive equilibrium include consumption C(b̂t, θt),
endogenous growth G(b̂t, θt), asset price Q(b̂t, θt), and bond holding B(b̂t, θt). Denote
the iteration step by j and start from arbitrary policy functions C0(b̂t, θt), G0(b̂t, θt),
Q0(b̂t, θt), and B0(b̂t, θt), where 0 means the iteration step j = 0. Given policy
functions in iteration step j, I solve policy functions for iteration j + 1 as follows:
1. For any θt ∈ Θ and b̂t+1 ∈ Gb, I can solve {ĉht , gt+1, q̂t} using equilibrium condi-
tions. Using the budget constraint, these allocations imply a unique b̂t. Then
I have a combination of {b̂t} and corresponding allocations {ĉht , gt+1, q̂t, b̂t+1}. I
can update policy functions using these combinations. In this process, I need
to deal with the collateral constraint. Specifically, I assume that the constraint
is slack and then check whether this condition is satisfied.
2. I first assume that the constraint is slack and allocations gt+1, ĉ
h
t , q̂t can be solved
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3. If the collateral constraint −b̂t+1gt+1 ≤ φq̂t is satisfied, I proceed to solve b̂t
using the budget constraint:
b̂t =
ĉht + h+ Ψ̂(gt+1) + b̂t+1gt+1 − θt
1 + r


























5. I can update policy functions using the combinations of b̂t and {gt+1, ĉht , q̂t, b̂t+1}.
6. I keep iterating until policy functions in two consecutive iterations are close
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enough.
To solve policy functions for the two social planners, I need to solve additional policy
functions of Lagrangian multipliers, such as µ(b̂t, θt) and ν(b̂t, θt), using equilibrium
conditions described in Appendix A.3. Otherwise, the procedure is the same as above.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Normalized Economy
In this appendix we show the derivation of the normalized economy starting from












Yt = Ft + ptQt
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Budget Constraint under No Default.
Ct + qtBt+1 + αQt+1ξ(p̄t) = Yt +Bt
where agents hedge Qt+1 production of oil at period t.
Budget Constraint under Default.
Ct = Yt −H(Yt)
where H(Yt) = h(yt)Ft.
Given that Ft grows at a constant rate G in every period, Ct and Bt+1 grow at
the same rate as Ft and Ft+1 respectively. In order to solve a stationary problem, we
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Ft
= 1 + ptQ
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= yt − h(yt)
Given the normalized preferences, total income, and the budget constraints, we
can solve the normalized economy problem knowing that the original problem can
always be recovered by multiplying all variables by Ft.
B.2 Proofs
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. If the economy defaults in H state, it must default in L state since yH > yL.











The economy finds it optimal not to default iff yL − d∗ > ydef .
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which is consistent iff yH − d∗∗ > ydef . Define ŷdef = yL− d∗ and ˆ̂ydef = yH − d∗∗ and
we establish the first part of the proposition.
In an economy with hedging, optimal borrowing d∗,hedge with no default satisfies
the following condition:
1









It is not hard to find d∗,hedge > d∗ since the marginal benefit of borrowing increases
and the marginal cost of borrowing declines. Using the same logic, we find that
d∗∗,hedge > d∗∗. This implies that ȳdef,hedge < ˆ̂ydef . However, ȳdef,hedge > ŷdef since
cL,hedge1 > c
L
1 due to the presence of hedging.
B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. If the economy does not default in equilibrium, the interest rate on debt is 1
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With the introduction of hedging, the optimality condition becomes
1










It is easy to see that d∗,hedge > d∗ since the income in first period is reduced by ξ and
income in L state has increased by ȳ − yL.
We also needs to establish the results that social welfare has been increased. Intu-
itively, hedging does not change the PDV of income stream but reduces the variance of
income. This is beneficial since it increases the welfare in the second period. Denote
the social welfare without and with hedging by U0(d
∗) and Uhedge0 (d
∗,hedge) respectively.
We want to show Uhedge0 (d
∗,hedge) > U0(d
∗) by proving Uhedge0 (d
∗ + ξ(ȳ)) > U0(d
∗). To
see it, we have
Uhedge0 (d




yH − ξ(ȳ)− d∗
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yH − (1− p)x− d∗
)
+ (1− p) log
(
yL + px− d∗
)]
increases in x ∈ [0, yH − yL].
B.2.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When the economy defaults only in the low-income state of nature, hedging is
beneficial if it reduces default incentives. If the economy does not default in equilib-
rium, social welfare increases with hedging (See Proposition 4). However, debt might

















It is hard to sign d∗∗ and d∗,hedge since both the marginal benefit and the marginal
cost of borrowing increase with hedging.
If hedging does not change default incentives, social welfare is lower since the
economy borrows more (See the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix B.2.2) and con-
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sumption streams are unambiguously lower. Clearly, social welfare is further reduced
if hedging increases default incentives. There is no borrowing in this case.
B.2.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The two-period model with forwards changes into the following form
U forwards0 = max
d
log c0 + β log c1
s.t. c0 = y + d,
c1 = max{ȳ − d, ydef}
where ȳ = pyH + (1− p)yL.






It is easy to show that d∗ < d∗,forwards since the marginal cost of borrowing
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which implies that ȳ − d∗,forwards > yL − d∗. It follows that ŷdef,forwards > ŷdef .
However, it is hard to sign ŷdef,forwards and ˆ̂ydef . As to welfare, if both economies
default in both states, economy with forwards has larger utility due to concavity of
log function. If economy defaults and forwards avoid default, welfare is larger in the
forwards economy. If economy defaults in low state and forwards economy defaults
in both states, welfare is lower in the forwards economy.
B.3 Algorithm
We solve the model using value function iteration. We create grid spaces for both
bt and pt and denote them by B and P respectively. Starting from an initial guess
for the bond price function qi(b
′, p) for each b ∈ B and p ∈P for iteration i = 0, we
implement the following algorithm:
1. Staring from an initial guess of {Vi(b, p), V di (p), V ci (b, p)} for each b ∈ B and
p ∈P for iteration i = 0.














(yH − d)(yL − d)(ȳ − d)
> 0
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2. Update V di+1(p) using equation (2.8),
3. Update V ci+1(b, p) according to equation (2.7).
4. Update Vi+1(b, p) using Vi+1(w, p) = max
{











′, p′) ≥ V di+1(p′)
]
1 + r∗
6. Iterate until the endogenous objectives qj(b
′, p), Vj(b, p), V
c
j (b
′, p′) and V dj (p) are
close enough for j = i and j = i+ 1.
B.4 Estimation of Oil Price Process
We estimate an AR(1) process for the oil price in logs, with the unconditional oil
price given by p̂ = 1
T
∑T
t=1 pt. We then impose the following functional form to get
an estimator for the AR(1) coefficient:
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t=2(log pt − µt−1)2














t=2(log pt − µt−1)2 = 0
B.5 Option Pricing
The payoff of the put options is given by max{p̄ − pt+1, 0} for strike price p̄ and
current price pt at time t. For a risk neutral investor, the put option is priced according
to the following formula:
ξ(pt) =
Et [max{p̄− pt+1, 0}]
1 + r∗
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Since we assume that log pt follows an AR(1) process, i.e.






































































Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The objective function for a benevolent government is
max
XG
E [u(X;φ)− U(X; Φ)− c(X; θ)− C(X; Θ)]
The optimality condition is
E[u′(XG;φ)] = E[U ′(XG; Φ) + c′(XG; θ) + C ′(XG; Θ)] (C.1)
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To implement XG, government could impose restrictions on individual production
xi ≤ XG. To see how it works, realize that XG < XCE. Otherwise, XG ≥ XCE. The
following relation implies a contradiction.
0 = E[u′(XG;φ)− U ′(XG; Φ)− c′(XG; θ)− C ′(XG; Θ)]
≤ E[u′(XCE;φ)− U ′(XG; Φ)− c′(XCE; θ)− C ′(XG; Θ)]
≤ −E[U ′(XG; Φ) + C ′(XG; Θ)]
< 0
Therefore, government can impose a restriction xi ≤ XG to individual producer and
it binds always.
C.1.2 Proof of Lemman 2
Proof. The objective function for an SRO is
max
XS
p(XS;φ)XS − c(XS; θ)− C(XS; Θ)
s.t. p(XS;φ) = u′(XS;φ)
The optimality condition is
u′(XS;φ) + u′′(XS;φ)XS = c′(XS; θ) + C ′(XS; Θ) (C.2)
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= c′(XS; θ) + C ′(XS; Θ)
where Ed(X
S;φ) is the price elasticity of demand at the point X = XS.
To implement XS, SRO could impose restrictions on individual production xi ≤
XS. To see how it works, realize that XS < XCE due to the following relationship.
u′(XCE;φ)− c′(XCE; θ) = 0
< −u′′(XS;φ)XS + C ′(XS; Θ)
= u′(XS;φ)− c′(XS; θ)
Then an SRO can impose a restriction xi ≤ XS to individual producer and it binds
always.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. If government has perfect information about F , it can choose XFB defined by
the optimality condition (3.2). Furthermore, XFB < XCE.
To implement XFB, government can regulate either consumers or producers. To
regulate the consumers, government can use a Pigovian tax τ on individual consumers
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and rebate them by a lump-sum transfer T . For the individual consumer j, his
objective function is thus
max
yj
u(yj;φ)− (p+ τ)yj − U(X; Ψ) + T
The optimality condition is
p+ τ = u′(yj;φ)
The optimality condition for producers is unaffected by the policy. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the following relationship holds.
τ = u′(X;φ)− c′(X; θ)
To implement the first best allocation, one can choose τ = U ′(XFB; Φ) +C ′(XFB; Θ)
and T = τXFB. Furthermore, one can simply put a quantity restriction yj ≤ XFB
on the individual consumer and implement the first best allocation. The reason is
that XFB < XCE in equilibrium.
By a similar argument, one can easily show that the first best allocation XFB can
be implemented by a tax τ ∗0 and a lump-sum transfer T
∗
0 on an individual producer.
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For individual producer i, his objective function is thus
max
xi
(p+ τ ∗0 )xi − c(xi; θ)− C(X; Θ) + T ∗0
The optimality condition is thus
p+ τ ∗0 = c
′(xi; θ)
The optimality condition for consumers is unaffected by the policy. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the following relation holds.
τ ∗0 = c
′(X; θ)− u′(X;φ)
By monotonicity of c′−u′, choosing τ ∗0 = −U ′(XFB; Φ)−C ′(XFB; Θ) can implement
XFB in the decentralized economy. Also T ∗0 = −τ ∗0XFB is implied by government’s
budget constraint. Similarly, one can also put a production restriction xi ≤ XFB to
implement XFB because XCE > XFB in equilibrium.
Now, we consider a case where the government allows the producers to form a




(u′(X;φ) + τ ∗1 )X − c(X; θ)− C(X; Θ) + T ∗1
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The optimality condition is thus
u′(X;φ) + τ ∗1 + u
′′(X;φ)X = c′(X; θ) + C ′(X; Θ)
Hence, one can choose τ ∗1 = −u′′(XFB;φ)XFB − U ′(XFB; Φ) and T ∗1 = −τ ∗1XFB
to implement XFB.
Interestingly, if τ ∗1 = −u′′(XFB;φ)XFB − U ′(XFB; Φ) > 0, it implies that XS <
XFB < XCE. In other words, government needs to subsidize an SRO to implement the
first best allocation. It turns out that there exists a specific number of monopolistic
competitive SROs such that the first best allocation XFB can be implemented. To
see this point, first assume that there exists N SROs in the market for self-regulation
and each has a market share of 1
N
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By symmetry, it implies
1
N
u′′(XN ;φ)XN + u′(XN ;φ) = c′(XN ; θ) +
C ′(XN ; Θ)
N
Realize that if N = 1, there is only one SRO in the market and X1 = XS; if N =∞,
there is a continuum of agents in the market and X∞ = XCE. Moreover, XN is an
increasing function of N . Therefore, if XS < XFB < XCE, by continuity there exists
N∗ such that XN
FB
= XFB.
C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Suppose government announces τ(X;φ) to an SRO and rebates it by T =
−τ(X;φ)X. The objective function for the SRO is
maxX [P (X;φ) + τ(X;φ)]X − c(X; θ)− C(X; θ) + T
s.t. P (X;φ) = u′(X;φ)
Notice that by choosing τ(X;φ) = −u′(X;φ) + u(X;φ)−E[U(X;Φ)]
X
, the SRO chooses the
second best allocation as in (3.3)
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C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. By choosing the price menu as P (X) = E[u′(X;φ)−U ′(X; Φ)], the government
can implement W̄ . To implement, government buys goods from an SRO according to
such price menu and sells to the consumer. The difference between selling and buying
is transferred to the SRO.
C.2 Derivation of Value Function
In period 1, define the state variable as m = ẽ − d1 and M = m in equilibrium.
The value function can be written as
V (m;M) = max
d2,θ
u(c1) + c2
s.t. c1 = m+ d2 + (1− κ)p,
c2 = κy − d2
d2 ≤ φp · · · (λ)
The FOCs are
u′(c1) = 1 + λ
u′(c1)p = y
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In equilibrium, since the asset is held only by bankers, κ = 1 and C1 = M+D2, where
the capital letters denote the aggregate level of variables. There are two states in
period 1. Define c∗ such that u′(c∗) = 1 and M̂ such that M̂ = c∗−φ. Then if M ≥ M̂ ,
the economy is in the unconstrained state and c1 = c∗, d2 = c
∗−m, p = 1; if M < M̂ ,
the economy is in the constrained state and c1 = m + φ
y
u′(c1)






u(c∗) + y +m− c∗ if M ≥ M̂
u (m+ φp(M)) + y − φp(M) if M < M̂
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